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Name: JEROME SEGURA III   
Date of Degree: JULY, 2013 
Title of Study: DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY  
Major Field: ECONOMICS  
Abstract: I provide two exercises which attempt to arrive at consistent estimates through 
the utilization of various instrumental variable (IV) and general method of moments 
(GMM) estimation approaches. My first study asks: is social network formation pro-
cyclical or counter-cyclical? While viewing social network formation as an investment 
concept at the individual level is well-established, how this mechanism is affected by 
aggregate fluctuations has not yet been studied. I use the General Social Survey (1972-
2010) to empirically test the net effect of aggregate fluctuations on individual-level social 
network investment. In my estimation, I attempt to address the reflection problem 
through the application of the Lee (2007) linear-in-means model which is most recently 
applied in Bramoullé et al. (2009) and Boucher et al. (2012). I also attempt to address 
possible bias resulting from unobserved heterogeneity. My findings indicate that social 
network investment is counter-cyclical. I use alternative measures of business cycle 
fluctuations and ad-hoc reference group formations; the results remain robust to these 
alternative measures and specifications. My second study asks: what are the growth 
effects of state and local fiscal policy. In deriving my estimable equation I combine a 
partial adjustment process with a factor market approach for modeling regional output. I 
utilize dynamic panel data estimation procedures in an attempt to arrive at a more refined 
set of estimates for the growth effects associated with state and local fiscal policy. I use 
annual observations for 48 contiguous U.S. jurisdictions ranging from 1977-2008 to 
empirically test the net effect of government fiscal policy on the growth rate of gross 
state product (GSP). To my knowledge, this is the first study which attempts to address 
the potential endogeneity of state and local fiscal policy. My findings indicate a large 
degree of heterogeneity between regions in response to effective tax rate hikes by state 
and local government. Although these results are robust to an alternative sample and 
following a reduction in the number of instruments, I am unable to verify the robustness 
of the estimated coefficients after a number of other alternative specifications. I interpret 
the results as an indication that policymakers should err on the side of caution in 
extrapolating the results of empirical studies to their own states and time periods. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The following two studies are samples of research I conducted as a doctoral student with the 
Department of Economics in the Spears School of Business at Oklahoma State University in 
Stillwater, Oklahoma. These studies are intended to exhibit my expertise as an applied 
microeconomist in the urban and regional economics field. My particular areas of interest are 
networking and public policy. I provide two exercises: I attempt to address the reflection 
problem, and I attempt to estimate a regional production function. 
The second chapter of my dissertation is titled “Friendships through Thick and Thin? Effect of 
Business Cycle Fluctuations on Social Network Formation”. This study further investigates the 
determinants of individual investment in social networking. More specifically, I study the 
connection between the national unemployment rate and the frequency of individual socialization 
with friends and neighbors. Often times social behaviors are subject to the reflection problem 
because real peer effects are present (Manski, 1993, 2000). Specifically, peer effects are the 
portion of individual behavior attributable to reference group membership. If average group 
behavior is a determinant of individual behavior, then the dependent variable is on both sides of 
the estimable equation. I employ the most up to date approach of linear-in-means modeling in an 
attempt to achieve identification with regards to parameter estimates.  
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The third chapter of my dissertation is titled “The Effect of State and Local Taxes on Economic 
Growth: A Dynamic Panel Approach”. In this study I investigate the effects of state and local 
fiscal policy on the growth rate of gross state product (GSP). It is thought that state and local tax 
revenue and government expenditures as a share of GSP propagate into differences in regional 
household utility. Just as with local amenities, state and local fiscal policy may generate 
compensating wage differentials within a spatial equilibrium framework, (Gyourko and Tracy, 
1989, 1991). I combine a partial adjustment process with the factor market approach for modeling 
regional output.  Arriving at an autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) model, I utilize dynamic 
panel data estimation strategies in an attempt to obtain at a more refined set of estimates for the 
growth effects associated with state and local fiscal policy.  
These two studies combine to form my dissertation. In the remainder of this dissertation, chapter 
2 explores the connection between the real business cycle and individual investment in social 
networking, chapter 3 explores the dynamic growth effects of state and local fiscal policy and 
chapter 4 concludes. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
FRIENDSHIPS THROUGH THICK AND THIN? EFFECT OF BUSINESS CYCLE 
FLUCTUATIONS ON SOCIAL NETWORK FORMATION 
 
The primary estimation issue addressed in spatial econometrics is the implicit endogeneity arising 
from the assumed spatial dependence between observations. This implicit endogeneity is 
particularly problematic within a locational choice framework wherein distances may be 
endogenous, e.g., through geographic sorting. A spatial autoregressive model (SAR) attempts to 
account for the spatial dependence between observations through the inclusion of spatial lags of 
the dependent variable on the right hand side of the estimable equation. Furthermore, the 
endogeneity concerns can be addressed through SAR estimation by taking either an instrumental 
variable (IV) approach or, when no valid external instruments are known, a general method of 
moments (GMM) approach.  
The reflection problem arises when average characteristics and behavior of the reference group 
influences the behavior of the individual group member (Manski, 1993 and 2000). Therefore, if 
peer effects are present, then the weighted sum of the dependent variable may be on the right 
hand side of the estimable equation. In other words, the reflection problem can best be described 
as the identification problem which arises in SAR estimation. Additionally, the perfect 
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collinearity between expected group behavior and observed group characteristics makes 
identification particularly difficult. Pinkse and Slade (2010) identify a number of other limitations 
of a first-order spatial autoregressive model. 
Moreover, relative to time series econometrics, spatial econometric theory lags conspicuously 
behind the wide array of applications (Pinkse and Slade, 2010). Although partial identification 
has caught considerable attention in recent spatial studies, identification is not always a primary 
issue addressed in the estimation of econometric models with spatially dependent observations. 
For example, networking studies are often plagued by an estimable equation wherein the 
dependent variable appears on the right hand side once again. In application, this study attempts 
to achieve identification by isolating the portion of one’s socializing behavior attributable to 
geographic sorting.  
In the remainder of the chapter, section 2.1 introduces and motivates the exercise. Section 2.2 
explains why social network stock is a determinant of social network flow. Section 2.3 discusses 
the reflection problem and how I try to account for it. Section 2.4 discusses the empirical model. 
Section 2.5 discusses the data. Section 2.6 discusses the ad-hoc reference group formation. 
Section 2.7 discusses the main set of results. Section 2.8 discusses some robustness checks and 
section 2.9 concludes. 
2.1  INTRODUCTION 
In a large number of instances, mutually beneficial trades take place not through the market but 
rather through interpersonal relationships. Diverse areas of research emphasize the beneficial 
aspects of social networks. For example, networks serve to channel information about new 
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technology, employment, and market opportunities.
1
 Social networks also reduce search costs; 
this is particularly important within labor markets where interpersonal relationships have a 
significant influence (Granovetter, 1985; Montgomery, 1991). Furthermore, social networks 
deliver several non-market benefits such as insurance during bad times when people fall back on 
personal contacts for support, e.g., financial support.
2
 Social ties and contacts also have other 
non-economic returns such as prestige, respect, and social recognition of wealth and other 
desirable attributes (Lin, Cook, and Burt, 2001). An important motivation for individuals to 
engage in socializing is the satisfaction from interaction with others (Durlauf and Fafchamps, 
2005).
3
 In terms of aggregate level outcomes, Knack and Keefer (1997) find growth implications 
of societal trust and organizational membership. Rauch (2001) shows the importance of ethnic 
ties in international trade.  
Social networks are shown to have a wide range of influences on the individual’s economic and 
non-economic lives as well as the aggregate outcomes of the economy. As a result, the 
determinants of social networks have gained significant attention in the recent literature (Durlauf 
and Fafchamps, 2005; Calvo-Armengol, Patacchini and Zenou, 2009; Knack and Keefer, 1997; 
Rauch, 2001). A well-developed theoretical foundation of social networks has evolved over the 
last decade (Jackson, 2005; Calvo-Armengol and Ilkilic, 2009; Ballester, Calvo-Armengol and 
Zenou, 2010; Calvo-Armengol and Jackson, 2010). However, with a handful of exceptions such 
as Glaeser et al. (2002) and a few others discussed later, the empirical research on the 
determinants of social networks is conspicuously lagging behind. As a result, while the ubiquity 
                                                          
1
 In the literature on knowledge spillover, social ties and contacts play a crucial role not only in 
dissemination of ideas but also in the cross breeding of ideas through social interaction [Jacobs, 1969; 
Krugman, 1991]. 
2
 Carter and Maluccio [2003] in a study of South African households showed that households with more 
social capital seemed better able to weather shocks. 
3
 Dasgupta [2005] describes socializing as a ‘pleasurable activity’. 
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of social networks is well-established, little effort could be made to utilize social networks as a 
policy tool. 
In this paper I focus on the determination of social network formation at the individual level. In 
Granovetter’s celebrated embeddedness hypothesis, social and economic outcomes are achieved 
through the interaction between social, economic, physical and environmental conditions 
(Granovetter, 1985). The particular contextual feature that I focus on is aggregate business cycle 
fluctuations. In other words, I am the first to investigate the question: Is social network formation 
pro-cyclical or counter-cyclical?  
Business cycles have been shown to influence individual decisions with regards to investment in 
human capital, housing and the consumption of durable goods (Gregorio, Guidotti, and Vegh, 
1998; Dellas and Sakellaris, 2003; Christian, 2007).
4
 Investment in health is also found to be 
counter-cyclical. For example, physical activity is found to be reduced during economic booms 
while individual eating habits are found to improve during economic downturns (Dave and Kelly 
2010; Ruhm, 2005). During economic downturns the consumption of alcohol and tobacco 
increase while fruit and vegetable consumption decrease (Dee, 2001; Dave and Kelly, 2010).  
Business cycle fluctuations may induce an adjustment in the individual’s decision as expectations 
and the feasible set change. Just as this reasoning applies to investment in human capital or 
health, it applies to investment in social networks. If the intrinsic benefits associated with social 
networks improve during periods of deteriorating macroeconomic conditions, then the individual 
may have the incentive to invest more in social capital. Individuals may engage in more social 
network investment (especially maintenance investment) during economic downturn to extract 
greater social support. Individuals at high risk of experiencing an unemployment spell, in 
particular, may increase social network investment in order to seek information about economic 
                                                          
4
 Dellas and Sakellaris (2003) find that individual propensity to enroll in college is countercyclical. Li 
(2005) discuss U.S. business cycles and homeownership rates. 
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opportunities and receive other assistance from social networks. Diminished opportunity costs 
could also lead the individual to the same behavior, e.g., reduced opportunity costs due to lower 
incomes during recessions. On the other hand, recessions may impose additional constraints on 
individual’s time and other resources leading to a lowering of social network investment. The 
impact of business cycle fluctuations on investment in social networking, therefore, must be 
tested empirically.  
I use the General Social Survey (GSS) (1972-2010) to empirically test the net effect of aggregate 
fluctuations on individual-level social network investment. The contributions of the paper are the 
following. First, I show the equation to estimate social network investment should include social 
network stock on the right hand side. Note that social network stock refers to a measure of the 
total number of links in the individual’s social network at a point in time. On the other hand, 
social network investment flow refers to the rate of activities employed by the individual to 
acquire and/or maintain these network links. For example, the number of friends an individual has 
at a point in time is a measure of her stock while the time she spends with her friends in weekly 
card games is a measure of her investment activities. From a theoretical point of view, 
investment, a policy variable in a dynamic program, is a function of the state variable, the stock. 
Intuitively, an individual with a large stock of friends need to spend more time – compared to 
someone with a smaller stock of friends – in maintenance of this large circle of friends. While 
stock is reported for a very small subset of my sample, stock measures are only reported in three 
years. Following Manksi (1993) I omit the stock variable from the empirical analysis, because 
measurements of individual stock are not widely available.
5
 
Second, as with most social behaviors, social network investment is also subject to the 
identification problem known as the reflection problem (Manski 1993, 2000).  In section 2.4, I 
                                                          
5
 I have devised a strategy which allows for the inclusion of stock wherein state unemployment rates are 
instrumented with the change in industry mix by state. 
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show that if the endogenous effect is left untreated the effect of business cycles on social network 
investment may not be identified. I apply the Lee (2007) linear-in-means model to the ad-hoc 
group approach in addressing the reflection problem and arrive at more refined estimates for the 
determinants of social network investment. To my knowledge Bramoullé et al. (2009) and  
Boucher et al. (2012) are the only two papers which empirically apply the Lee (2007) model. 
Finally, unobserved heterogeneity may play a role in a regression of individual social network 
investment on business cycles. There can be cultural trends or other intangible attitudinal factors 
influencing both the individual’s behavior as well as macroeconomic performance. In that case, 
the coefficient of the business cycle variable may be subject to bias. I instrument the business 
cycle variable with money supply growth to address this issue. While money supply is strongly 
correlated with economic performance, there is no a priori reason to believe individual social 
networking behavior would follow money supply fluctuations.   
My findings suggest that business cycle fluctuations do affect social network investment of the 
individual and it is counter-cyclical. My results are robust to a number of alternative measures of 
the flow of social networks. I also use alternative measures of business cycle fluctuations that I 
obtain from different sources, all of which show a similar pattern. 
2.2  METHODOLOGY 
I follow the investment approach of Glaeser et al. (2002) in modeling individual investment in 
social networking. I model an individual embedded within a social ‘reference group’,   . The 
individual maximizes lifetime returns by choosing the optimal investment in social networking,  . 
Let   be a continuous stock of social networking such that   
   (            ), where, a prime 
indicated next period’s value,    denotes individual characteristics,     denotes the characteristics 
of the reference group,   . The individual maximizes the return to social networking, 
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 (              ), where    are the current macroeconomic conditions. The return to social 
networking is the difference between utility,  (              ), and costs,  (              ). 
Therefore,        and   (   ), the infinite horizon Bellman equation is 
(E2.1)  (  )     {  }   (               )    ( (            )). 
The individual chooses    which maximizes the lifetime return to social networking by satisfying 
both the individual’s intertempoal optimality condition and Envelope condition. The Euler 
equation is 
(E2.2)     (              )     ( (              ))  (            ), 
and the Envelope condition is 
(E2.3)  (  )     (              )    ( (            ))  (            ), 
where,  (  )  
  (  )
   
. Equation (E2.3) indicates the shadow price of social capital is equal to the 
marginal rewards from the additional capital stock, both present and future. Equation (E2.3) 
implies 
(E2.4)   ( (            ))  
 (  )    (            )
  (           )
. 
Combining equations (E2.2) and (E2.4) yield, 
(E2.5)     (              )  [ (  )     (              )] 
  (           )
  (           )
. 
Equation (E2.5) implies the implicit function for the individual investment decision, 
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(E2.6)     (           ). 
Equation (E2.6) indicates that individual’s current investment in social networking may be 
written as a function of her current stock of social networking and current macroeconomic 
conditions, parameterized by her own characteristics and her group’s characteristics. 
2.3  REFLECTION PROBLEM 
To illustrate the reflection problem associated with estimating equation (E2.6) I follow Manski 
(1993). Figure 2.1 shows the different sources of influence on social network investment activity 
of the individual. I assume that influences of the group on individual’s social network investment 
decision come from the following sources: average investment in group     [  |  ],  group 
characteristics measured as average of the individual characteristics of group   ,  [  |  ], and 
unobserved characteristics of the individuals belonging to group,    . I specify the log linear 
regression equation version of (E2.6) as,  
(E2.7)         
       [  |  ]   [  |  ]
       
         , 
where    is the logarithm of   ,     are reference group dummies,   are indicators of current 
macroeconomic conditions, and    is the error term.6 Note the unobserved influences of the group 
are captured by the group dummies. My primary coefficient of interest is    that estimates the 
direct effects of business cycle fluctuations on investment in social networking. If       then 
there exists endogenous social effects, and {       } represent existence of exogenous social 
effects and correlated effects, respectively. Note that equation (E2.7) is similar to equation (E2.1) 
in Manski (1993).  
                                                          
6
   For notational simplicity, in this exposition    is treated as a part of   . Also, the influences of    are 
split into the observed characteristics  [  |   ] and  [  |   ], and unobserved characteristics. 
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Integrating both sides of (E2.7) with respect to    shows that  [  |  ]  solves the “social 
equilibrium” equation, 
(E2.8)  [  |  ]      [  |  ]
 (     )     [  |  ]     
         . 
Provided that     , equation (E2.1) has the unique solution, 
(E2.9)  [  |  ]  
  
    
  [  |  ]
 (
     
    
)     
   
    
  
  
    
 
 
    
. 
This implies that unless     is identified (              ) are not identified. 
2.4  EMPIRICAL MODEL 
To estimate equation (E2.6) I follow Lee (2007) whereas individual investment in social 
networking is represented by a linear-in-means model 
(E2.10)           
∑       
    
   
∑       
    
    
          , 
where the individual   is embedded within some reference group    where     . Notice this is 
similar to equation (9) in Bramoullé et al. (2009) and equation (1) in Boucher et al. (2012). Recall 
that my primary coefficient of interest is    which estimates the direct effects of business cycle 
fluctuations on investment in social networking.  
Exogenous variation to group size,   , is a necessary condition with regards to the identification 
strategy discussed in Lee (2007) and Bramoullé et al. (2009). The within reference group effect 
attributed to any particular individual is inversely related to the size of that group. An increase in 
group size leads to a reduction in the influence of each individual on the group itself. Therefore, 
variation in group size is what allows for the disentaglement of   ,    and     capturing the 
endogenous effect, the exogenous effect and the correlated effects, respectively i.e., possible 
12 
 
weak identification of the reflection problem. Again, exogenous variation in reference group size, 
  , is a source of weak identification in this model . 
Boucher et al. (2012) goes on to show that the Lee (2007) linear-in-means model may be fully 
identified. Also, Boucher et al. (2012) clarifies the intuition by focusing on an individual 
characteristic. For example, take educational attainment. Identification in the Lee (2007) model 
arises through the omission of the individual in calculating group means of the exogenous 
variables, e.g., group mean educational attainment.  Given any arbitrary reference group I could 
sort individual members by educational attainment in order to obtain the most educated member. 
Being above average, the most educated member of the reference group unavoidably has a group 
of peers with a mean educational attainment which is below average.  
This negative correlation reduces the dispersion in individual investment in social networking 
provided  a positive affect associated  with both individual and group mean educational 
attainment, i.e.,   ,     . Within the Lee (2007) framework smaller groups would inherently 
experience greater variance in group mean educational attainment, and as a result the reduction in 
outcome dispersion is greater in smaller groups. This is indicative of the negative relationship 
between group size and the within reference group effect attributed to the educational attainment 
of any particular individual. If     , then the endogenous effect reduces the dispersion in 
individual investment as well. In addition, the assumed simultaneity between average group 
behavior and mean group characteristics result in different shapes of dispersion reduction. 
Therefore, following the within group transformation, identification of the endogenous, 
exogenous, and correlated effects is made possible by distinguishing between shapes of outcome 
dispersion, i.e.,   ,    and   , respectively.  
Bramoullé et al. (2009) write the structural model of equation (E2.10) in matrix notation such that 
(E2.11)           ̂                  ,   ̂    (      
      ), 
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where   is a weighting matrix.7 Suppose I have two groups,       . Then the weighting matrix 
  [
   
   
], where    is a block diagonal matrix with off-diagonals taking the value of 
 
    
   
The matrix operation    yields the average investment in social networking by group,   , i.e., the 
weighted average of individual level flow for group   . Notice that individual   is excluded from 
their own group average. Therefore, each individual within the group may have a unique set of 
observed group level characteristics. The matrix operation    yields a block diagonal matrix 
   [
  
  
   
 ], where   
  is a block diagonal matrix with diagonals equal to 
 
    
 and the off 
diagonals taking the value of 
(    )
(    ) 
 when group size is larger than two.   and    are linearly 
independent. 
I explicitly estimate equation (E2.11) using a two-step process including reference group 
indicator variables, i.e., a 2SLS fixed effects estimator. First, following Bramoullé et al. (2009) 
and Boucher et al. (2012) I instrument   , average group flow, with          and     in order 
to obtain the predicted group average flow   ̂. Next, I estimate the determinants of individual 
investment in social networking excluding     from the second-step estimation. 
Identification also relies on the linear indepenence of   and   . This property is ensured under 
the Lee (2007) linear-in-means model. Appendix A2.1 revisits the reflection problem under the 
Lee (2007) linear-in-means model and follows equations (E2.5) through (E2.7) of Bramoullé et 
al. (2009) in order to show that higher order moments of the weighting matrix   are valid 
instruments for average reference group behavior. 
                                                          
7
 Notice that equation (E2.11) is similar to equation (1) in Bramoullé et al. (2009). 
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2.5  DATA 
I use the General Social Survey (GSS
8
) 1972-2012 Cross-Sectional Cumulative Data which is a 
repeated annual cross-section of 1,200 to 2,500 individuals. The primary measure for the flow of 
social networking, lnsocflow, is the number of social evenings spent “with someone who lives in 
your neighborhood” and the number of social evenings spent “with friends who live outside the 
neighborhood” per year. My primary sample consists of 15,746 employed respondents with year 
of survey ranging from 1988 through 2010. The data set includes the following individual 
demographic characteristics: age, sex, race, marital status, educational attainment and 
homeownership status. A full list of variables with data source and variable description is 
included in Appendix A2.2. 
In particular, I am concerned about the investment in social networking arising from business 
cycle fluctuations within the labor market. Here, my primary variable of interest is the two-period 
moving average of the unemployment rate, i.e., the two-period average of the number of 
unemployed to labor force ratio, as well as two other measures: two-period moving averages of 
unemployed to employed ratio and unemployed to population ratio. To account for the potential 
unobserved heterogeneity which may arise from, say, social attitudes with regards to the future 
economic climate, e.g., feelings of optimism or pessimism, I instrument each of the 
macroeconomic indicators using lagged M1 and M2 growth. Table 2.1 contains the summary 
statistics for all macroeconomic indicators: natunemppopma, natunemppopma, natunempempma, 
m1gthl1, m2gthl.  
                                                          
8
 Smith, Tom W, Peter Marsden, Michael Hout, and Jibum Kim. General Social Surveys, 1972-2012 
[machine-readable data file] /Principal Investigator, Tom W. Smith; Co-Principal Investigator, Peter V. 
Marsden; Co-Principal Investigator, Michael Hout; Sponsored by National Science Foundation. --NORC  
ed.-- Chicago: National Opinion Research Center [producer]; Storrs, CT: The Roper Center for Public  
Opinion Research, University of Connecticut [distributor], 2013. 
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2.6  GROUPINGS 
My identification strategy involves assuming an exogenous classification of reference group,   . I 
attempt to address the reflection problem discussed in Section 2.4 by forming reference groups 
based on three criteria: First, the decade in which the individual responded to the survey. Second, 
the population of the city in which the survey was conducted. And lastly, the respondent’s 
geographic state of residence. Unlike in Manksi (2000) wherein 1970 occupational code defines 
reference group, I define groups by decade, city population, and U.S. geographic state. The 
decade component of group formation is intended to further account for inter-temporal group 
heterogeneity in the absence of year fixed effects. This reference group structure isolates 107 
individuals. I drop these randomly isolated individuals. Summary statistics for this sample is 
included in Table 2.1.
9
 The group count variable summarizes the distribution of group size,   . 
Figure 2.2 is a kernel density plot of group size. Notice that group size is relatively small. As a 
robustness check, I redefine reference groups by a categorical variable of city population by state 
for each decade. 
2.7  RESULTS 
Again, the business cycle variables are yearly measures, therefore, including year dummies create 
multicollinearity problems. Recall that group formation is ad-hoc and based on the decade over 
time. Furthermore, I use an instrumental variable approach to account for unobserved 
heterogeneity, cultural trends, and/or unobserved attitudinal factors that may be correlated with 
both individual social network investment and the business cycle.  
Table 2.5 includes my main set of results. All regressions, excluding the macroeconomic 
instrumentation, include recoverable, reference group fixed effects. Again, following Bramoullé 
et al. (2009) I now instrument group flow,   , with my full set of explanatory variables,     , 
                                                          
9
 Summary statistics for the isolated sample is included in Table 8. 
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    and    . Column 1 of Table 2.5 is the first stage results, i.e., determinants of group 
investment. Summary statistics of the predicted group social flows are presented in Table 2.2. 
The general significance of       and     indicate my technical instruments do have some 
explanatory power. Although, the first stage regression is overidentified, I do not correct the 
standard errors because these are merely technical instruments.
10
  
Column 2 of Table 2.5 is the individual investment regression, i.e., the second stage regression, 
which includes the two-period moving average of the national unemployment rate, 
natunemplfma, as an explanatory variable. In column 3, I instrument natunemplfma using lagged 
M1 and M2 growth. Table 2.4 summarizes the predicted labor market indicators. Column 4 of 
Table 2.5 is the regression of primary interest and includes both the average, predicted group flow 
and the predicted 2-period moving average of the nation unemployment rate, natunemplfma. The 
coefficient on natunemplfma is positive and significant in columns 2 and 4 with a reduction in 
magnitude following instrumentation of the macroeconomic indicator. F-stats for the overall fit of 
the models are significant throughout all of Table 2.5. I find evidence that white respondents 
invest more frequently in social networking. Perhaps whites invest more in networking due to 
increased returns to social networking. I find evidence of a nonlinear response to age. This is 
consistent with the life cycle view of social networking wherein the young foresee relatively large 
returns to social networking and with respect to aging make subsequently smaller investments in 
social networking. Consistent with Manski (2000) the estimated coefficients suggest homeowners 
along with college graduates invest more in social networking. Consistent with the literature, 
married individuals invest less, perhaps, as they fall back on their spouse’s network for support as 
well. 
                                                          
10
 Recall that identification of the business cycle coefficient is only possible after I have identified the peer 
effects, i.e. the endogenous effect,   , the exogenous effect,   , and the correlated effects,    . 
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Table 2.6 exhausts the remaining macroeconomic indicators. Column 5-7 substitutes the two-
period moving average of national unemployment to population for natunemplfma from columns 
2-4 of Table 2.5. Similarly, columns 8-10 substitute two-period moving average of national 
unemployment to employment for the previous. My results are robust to the changes. The positive 
coefficient on the two-period moving average of the national unemployment rate indicates in 
Table 2.5 and again in Table 2.6 that the flow of social networking is up when unemployment 
rates are up. Again, people invest more in social networking during times of high unemployment. 
2.8  ROBUSTNESS 
As a robustness check, reference groups are redefined using a categorical city size measure, 
geographical state of residence and the decade dummy variables. This reference group 
specification reduces the 107 isolated individuals to only 9. However, the average group count 
increases from 19 to 80. Bramoullé et al. (2009) points out identification may depend explicitly 
on the distribution of group size in complex ways. Conceptually, smaller group sizes are preferred 
to larger group size. Table 2.8 includes these robustness checks. Columns 11 through 13 are the 
same as regressions 2 of Table 2.5 and regressions 5 and 8 from Table 2.6. Columns 14 through 
16 substitute in the predicted macroeconomic indicators as with regressions 4 of Table 2.5 and 
regressions 7 and 10 of Table 2.6. Again, I find evidence that investment in social networking is 
counter-cyclical. However, the relatively large group size may restrict the models ability to 
identify the peer effects individually. 
2.9  CONCLUSIONS 
Social networks have profound impacts on our economic and non-economic lives. To my 
knowledge, this paper is the first to analyze the impact of business cycles on individual level 
social network formation. Business cycles can affect social network investment in different ways. 
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I try to address the reflection problem and account for unobserved heterogeneity. I believe this 
analysis expands our understanding of individual’s social network formation.  
Although measurements of individual stock are not widely available, a small subset of individuals  
report stock during non-downturn years only. Inter-state variation in unemployment rates may be 
exploited in a way which allows for the inclusion of a measurement for individual stock as well 
as annual fixed effects. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
THE EFFECT OF STATE AND LOCAL TAXES ON ECONOMIC GROWTH:  
A DYNAMIC PANEL APPROACH 
 
In the previous chapter, I attempted to address the estimation issues which arise when 
observations are assumed to be spatially dependent, i.e., SAR estimation issues. In this chapter I 
extend the static work of Brown et al. (2003) by deriving a dynamic factor market approach to 
model regional output. I arrive at a first order autoregressive distributed lag, ARDL, estimable 
regional production function. Whereas the SAR model incorporates spatial lags in an attempt to 
account for the spatial dependence between observations, the ARDL model incorporates time 
series lags in an attempt to account for the inter-temporal dependence between observations. 
Therefore, this chapter attempts to address the estimation issues which arise when inter-temporal 
dependencies between observations are assumed, e.g., when estimating either an Euler equation 
or a production function. 
In this chapter, I attempt to address the issues associated with estimating an ARDL regional 
production function. However, physical capital stock measures are not widely available at the 
state level. Alternatively, I estimate a reduced-form regional production function which does not 
require the quantities of private capital and labor. 
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Within this framework, the reduced-form output equation relates state and local fiscal policy and 
other variables to statewide output. This is in stark contrast to the dynamic framework of Blundell 
and Bond (2000) and Bond (2002) which fit a Cobb-Douglas production function to firm level 
data. I use two estimation approaches in an attempt to arrive at consistent estimates for the effect 
of state and local fiscal policy and other variables on state output growth. Additionally, this 
chapter attempts to address an extensive list of other estimation issues common to microeconomic 
studies. 
In the remainder of the chapter section 3.1 introduces and motivates the exercise. Section 3.2 
builds the theoretical framework by substituting the partial adjustment migration process from 
Partridge and Rickman (2003) into the Brown et al. (2003) factor market approach for modeling 
regional economic growth. Section 3.3 presents the ARDL empirical model. Section 3.4 discusses 
the data. Section 3.5 presents the main set of results. Section 3.6 evaluates an extensive set of 
robustness checks and section 3.7 concludes. 
3.1  INTRODUCTION 
An extensive literature examines the connection between state and local fiscal policy and the 
local economic environment, e.g., Helms, (1985), Mofidi and Stone (1990), Bartik, (1991) and 
Wasylenko (1997). Brown et al. (2003) divide the literature into three distinct sets. First, studies 
such as Carlino and Mills (1985), Bartik (1985 and 1988), Carlton (1983), Papke (1991), and 
Gray (1997) examine the effect of state and local fiscal policy and natural amenities on regional 
economic growth, e.g., personal income, GSP, or firm location. A second set of literature 
examines how differences in state and local fiscal policy and natural amenities propagate into 
regional differentials in wage rates, e.g., Roback (1982), Beeson and Eberts (1989), Gyourko and 
Tracy (1989), and Haughwout (2002). Lastly, the third set of studies such as Aschauer (1989),  
Munnell (1990), Holz-Eakin (1994), Bartik (1996), Garcia-Milà, McGuire and Porter (1996), 
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Morrison and Schwartz (1996), Kelejian and Robinson (1997), Boarnet (1998), Button (1998), 
Fernald (1999), and Puig-Junoy (2001) examine the connection between regional variation in 
factor inputs and regional output. 
Within the literature it is thought state and local fiscal policy may alter the relative attractiveness 
between jurisdictions, thereby, affecting local area conditions. For example, as with natural 
amenities within the Rosen-Roback spatial equilibrium framework, Gyourko and Tracy (1989) 
show publicly produced services create compensating wage differentials. Therefore, tax rates and 
infrastructure investments by the state and local government are thought to be a source of 
regional competition for economic activity (Haughwout, 2002). The literature generally finds 
evidence in support of the claim that local conditions are affected by state and local fiscal policy. 
However, the growth effect estimates of any particular government policy decision are wildly 
inconsistent from study to study. This paper proposes that, perhaps, regional response 
heterogeneities to state and local fiscal policy play a critical role in the inconsistent results of 
previous tax studies. For example, suppose that households and/or firms find southern states to be 
highly substitutable. Then, policymakers in the South would face relatively high levels of 
competition from neighboring states in attracting firms and households. Therefore, the growth 
effects of a tax hike in the South may be particularly different from the national average. 
Reed (2008) outlines a number of issues common to the study of growth effects associated with 
state and local fiscal policy. Under the consideration that theoretical derivations yield the 
estimable equation, Reed (2008) stresses the importance of theoretical modeling
12
. The lack of 
theoretical modeling has led to an extensive list of non-fiscal controls having been used from time 
to time, e.g., percent unionization, population density, population, percentage of the population 
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 Reed (2008) identifies three unique estimation issues, i.e. the use of economic theory to derive an 
estimable equation, the role of time, and selection of control variables. In contrast to the previously 
mentioned study, I group these estimation issues into the importance of appropriate theoretical modeling. 
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that is working age, the unemployment rate, and crime rate. A survey of the literature indicates 
the growth effect estimates are highly dependent upon the particular set of control variables.  On 
the other hand, studies such as Merriman (1990), Garcia–Milá and McGuire (1992), Evans and 
Karras (1994), Holz–Eakin (1994), Garcia–Milá, McGuire and Porter (1996), Aschauer (2000), 
Yamarik (2000), Shioji (2001), and  Reed (2008) model local output within a Barro (1990) 
endogenous growth framework wherein local factors such as land, labor, and capital, are growth 
determinants.  
Although state capital stock measures are not widely available, a number of studies do obtain 
estimates for highways, sewers, and water supply systems and total state and local government 
capital, e.g., Morrison and Schwartz (1996) and Kelejian and Robinson (1997). The data are 
typically estimated following the Munnell (1990) approach wherein U.S. estimates of private 
capital are decomposed into state-level industry estimates based on information from industry 
censuses. Missing observations are filled by imposing an industry specific, national rate of 
growth during non-census years. Under this approach, as Brown et al. (2003) point out, the 
growth rate of private capital stock estimates differ from the national rate only during census 
years. Therefore, Brown et al. (2003) fill the missing observations with an interpolation strategy 
which accounts for capital stock growth rate differentials during non-census years as well. In 
contrast to the studies which rely on state capital, I estimate a reduced form regional production 
function wherein only local characteristics matter. 
Reed (2008) points out that time plays two key roles from a modeling standpoint. First, the length 
of time period may play a significant role in determining the measured effects associated with 
state and local fiscal policy, e.g., annual studies, quinquennial studies, or decennial studies. 
Second, the effects of a state and local fiscal policy may be dynamic in nature tax. ”Much of the 
previous literature has restricted taxes to have only contemporaneous effects on economic 
activity” (Reed, 2008).  In contrast, this paper takes a dynamic approach in modeling local, 
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private GSP. The first contribution of this study is the refinement to the Brown et al. (2003) factor 
market approach for modeling private GSP. I adopt a partial adjustment process for modeling 
local output growth which is similar to the process governing migration in Partridge and Rickman 
(2003). Through the incorporation of a dynamic adjustment process I arrive at an autoregressive 
distributed lag model for local private output.  
Reed (2008) identifies that a second issue arises in structuring of the dataset. Studies which focus 
on cross sectional data ignore potentially time-varying behavior in the control variables. In the 
absence of location fixed effect cross sectional studies also suffer from the common omitted 
variable bias. On the other hand, studies which focus on annual panel data are particularly 
sensitive to measurement error bias. Furthermore, this bias is worsened with the inclusion of 
jurisdiction fixed effects. Lastly, serial correlation is a particularly relevant threat to studies 
focused on panel data. In contrast, multi-year interval data are less sensitive to measurement error 
and serial correlation. Previous research on state and local taxes and growth have relied primarily 
on either cross sectional data, e.g., Romans and Subrahmanyam (1979), Mullen and Williams 
(1994), and Yamarik (2000), or annual panel data, e.g., Helms (1985) and Crain and Lee (1999). I 
follow the latter and examine the growth effects of state and local fiscal policy using annual 
observations for 51 jurisdictions within the U.S. including the District of Columbia ranging from 
1977 through 2008.  
Reed (2008) identifies that a third issue arises in choosing the appropriate estimator. Most of the 
previous studies apply ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation, e.g., Garcia–Milá and McGuire 
(1992), Chernick (1997), and Crain and Lee (1999). A subset of studies attempt to address error 
structures typical to panel data estimation. For example, Aschauer (2000) and Tomljanovich 
(2004) account for heteroskedastic errors, whereas, Evans and Karras (1994) attempt to address 
serial correlation in the errors. On the other hand, some of the studies attempt to apply feasible 
generalized least squares (FGLS) to account for random effects. However, the FGLS estimates 
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are often rejected for the alternative OLS with fixed effects, e.g., Brown et al. (2003), and Reed 
(2008). With respect to a dynamic approach, Nickell (1981) derives the inconsistencies in the 
least squares dummy variable (LSDV) estimates of an ARDL model. Dynamic panel estimation 
on the other hand, e.g., Holz–Eakin (1994), Shioji (2001), and Bania et al. (2007), provides 
consistent estimates when the estimable equation includes both a lagged dependent variable and 
fixed effects. Bania et al. (2007), in particular, pursue the Arellano and Bond difference GMM 
approach (Arellano and Bond, 1991) in estimating the growth effects of state and local fiscal 
policy in an endogenous growth framework wherein government expenditures are categorized as 
either productive or health and welfare. In contrast to the previously mentioned study, I include a 
more extensive list of government expenditure categories. Additionally, I pursue two 
identification strategies in an attempt to obtain consistent estimates for the dynamic growth 
effects of state and local fiscal policy. First, I estimate the ARDL production function following 
an OLS approach which excludes jurisdictional fixed effects. Second, I apply a GMM, dynamic 
panel estimation approach to the ARDL estimable equation. 
The fourth issue which Reed (2008) identifies is the role of influential observations.  “Point 
estimates may mask the fact that results can be driven by just a few time periods, or just a few 
states” (Reed, 2008).  Therefore, I take deliberate steps in order to maximize the number of years 
contained within the data. I use a substantially larger dataset relative to Brown et al. (2003). My 
dynamic panel data set consists of annual observations for 48 contiguous jurisdictions within the 
U.S. ranging from 1977 through 2008. I evaluate the growth implications of state and local tax 
rates linearly and nonlinearly. Additionally, I search for evidence of changing tax sensitivities 
over time. A number of studies I have come across end their studies in 1997. Therefore, I search 
for evidence of a break in tax sensitivities occurring after 1997. Lastly, the empirical analysis 
continues under the assumption of heterogeneous responses to fiscal policy by region.  
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I follow the existing literature and lag all explanatory variables by one period such that they are 
all at least nominally predetermined, e.g., Garcia-Milà, McGuire and Porter (1996) and Brown et 
al. (2003). However, predetermined variables certainly may not be strictly exogenous.  Therefore, 
in addition to the four previously discussed empirical challenges, I also assume the set of control 
variables is endogenous. This study adds a fifth issue in estimating the growth effects associated 
with state and local fiscal policy, control set endogenity. Weak exogeneity is my primary 
empirical challenge in the absence of suitable instruments. To my knowledge, this is the first 
paper to address the potential endogeneity concerns of state and local fiscal policy.   
In this study, I must also address issues common in ARDL estimation, i.e., the combined presence 
of autocorrelation, predetermined variables and time invariant jurisdiction characteristics which 
may be correlated with the explanatory variables. GMM estimation attempts to address the 
potential endogeneity of the control variables. In an attempt to avoid introducing a spurious 
correlation between these variables and the error term GMM estimation uses appropriate lags to 
instrument all predetermined and endogenous variables. Furthermore, GMM estimates are 
derived through the comparison of two observably similar U.S. states, using the portion of fiscal 
policy attributable to their fiscal histories. Therefore, GMM estimation addresses the concerns 
over the role of time in determining the effects of fiscal policy, In addition, GMM estimation 
procedures are robust to both measurement error and omitted variable bias. 
My preliminary results indicate that GSP is nearly a random walk process. Therefore, I apply the 
system GMM estimator to the dynamic panel dataset. I employ a two-step GMM estimation 
approach which is “efficient and robust to all patterns of heteroskedasticity and cross correlation” 
(Roodman, 2009). Also the finite sample tends to severely bias standard errors toward zero 
(Arellano and Bond, 1991; Blundell and Bond, 1998). In other words, the asymptotic properties 
of the system GMM estimator in estimating the ARDL model do not hold with cross-sectional 
dominant data, i.e., small time dimension relative to the number of jurisdictions. Therefore, 
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significance tests of the GMM estimates are based on the appropriately corrected standard errors.  
I find no evidence to support a linear, nonlinear response to fiscal policy, or changing sensitivities 
with respect to time period in a nationwide/pooled context. On the other hand, both the OLS 
estimates with no jurisdiction dummies and the system GMM estimates indicate a large degree of 
heterogeneity at the regional level in response to a tax rate hike by state and local government, 
i.e., U.S. Census region. Although these results are robust to an alternative sample and a 
reduction in the number of instruments, I am unable to verify the robustness of the estimated 
coefficients following a number of other alternative specifications.  
3.2  METHODOLOGY 
I follow the factor market approach of Brown et al. (2003) in modeling regional economic 
growth. This is a spatial equilibrium framework which incorporates state and local fiscal controls 
in the determination of regional output levels. Under this framework firms use primarily three 
inputs: land, labor and capital,     and   respectively. Local households sell one unit of labor to 
local firms in order to produce output. Output in jurisdiction  ,   ,  is governed by a well behaved 
production function  (        ). The interaction between workers and perfectly competitive 
firms drives economic activity within local input markets. Local profits dictate the entry and exit 
of firms. 
Land,  , is assumed to be perfectly immobile. Therefore, the price of the land,  
(E3.1)     (  ), 
reflects all aspects of the local jurisdiction  , where    {           },    is the vector of revenue 
sources for the U.S. state and local government.    represents the vector of public goods and 
services funded by the state and local government.    is the unemployment rate in jurisdiction   
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and    is a vector of  jurisdictional natural amenity levels. Meanwhile, the household, i.e., labor, 
is assumed to be highly mobile. Households migrate to capture all jurisdiction specific benefits. 
Compensating differentials in wages,  
(E3.2)     (  ),  
reflect all jurisdictional differences excluding taxes on land, such that the expected utility in 
jurisdiction   is the same in all   jurisdictions,     ̅. Lastly, capital, is perfectly mobile across 
all   jurisdictions which ensures a national rate of return to capital,     ,      .  
Given the three factor price equations for  , , and  , I obtain reduced form private input 
requirements for labor and capital in jurisdiction  . 
(E3.3)     (  ) 
(E3.4)     (  ) 
Substituting equations (E3.3) and (E3.4) into jurisdiction  ’s well behaved production function 
yields the static equilibrium of private output level in jurisdiction  ,   
  where  
(E3.5)   
   (  ).  
Equation (E3.5) suggests the desired private output level in jurisdiction  ,   
 , reflects all aspects 
of the local jurisdiction: the vector of revenue sources by the U.S. state and local government, the 
vector of state and local government services, the unemployment rate in jurisdiction   and the 
vector of natural amenity levels. This is identical to the estimable equation in Brown et al. (2003), 
equation (15). Log output can be expressed linearly as, 
(E3.6)    
              . 
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If for example labor immobility is measurable, then the private output level in jurisdiction   may 
be regulated by a linear partial adjustment process such that 
(E3.7)            (   
       ),  
where   is the speed of adjustment. Equation (E3.7) is similar to equation 3 from Partridge and 
Rickman (2003).
13
 Substituting equation (E3.6) into equation (E3.7) yields the following 
autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) model for private output level in jurisdiction   
(E3.8)                                 , 
where      if   (   ). It is important to note the estimates for the parameters in equation 
(E3.6) and equation (E3.7) are recoverable, i.e.,       ,        and       .  
3.3  EMPIRICAL MODEL 
State output, equation (E3.8), is once again rewritten to reflect individual aspects of the local 
jurisdiction,  
(E3.9)                                                 , 
where    are fixed effects which capture time invariant differences in output by jurisdiction,    
capture time fixed effects, and     represent random disturbances in jurisdictional output. 
Whereas, most of the literature estimates some variation of equation (E3.6), this study focuses on 
the consistent estimation of equation (E3.8). The parameters    and    give the percent change in 
private GSP due to a one percent increase in some government fiscal category, e.g., tax revenue 
or highway infrastructure expenditures as shares of GSP. In this model deficit spending and 
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 Partridge and Rickman (2003) propose a partial adjustment process for migration with regards to the 
exploitation of regional differentials in utility levels. 
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miscellaneous revenue are the omitted government fiscal categories. Therefore,    and    are 
interpreted as the growth effects resulting from incremental changes in revenue or expenditure 
variables against a change in the omitted fiscal category. For example,    measures the sensitivity 
of jurisdictional output given a change in tax revenue hikes against an increase in deficit 
spending. Meanwhile,       measures the net effect of an incremental increase in any 
particular expenditure category fully financed through raised revenue. Equation (E3.9) is referred 
to as the levels equation. The differenced equation,  
(E3.10)                                                   , 
removes all time invariant influences.  
With respect to the levels equation Mishra and Newhouse (2009) point out three empirical issues 
common to ARDL model estimation. The first issue arises from the combined presence of the 
lagged dependent variable, predetermined variables, and time-invariant jurisdictional 
characteristics, which may be correlated with the explanatory variables
14
 in the set of explanatory 
variables. The LSDV estimates of equation (E3.9) are inconsistent when jurisdictional dummies, 
  , are included (Nickell, 1981). In order to avoid the potentially inconsistent estimates of the 
within estimation, my OLS estimates drop the state fixed effects from equation (E3.9), i.e.,    
 .   ,   ,   ,   ,    and    are identified in the OLS version of equation (E3.9) where    are 
omitted by using both across-jurisdiction and within-jurisdiction variation. Significance of my 
OLS estimates are based upon standard errors clustered by U.S. geographic state. 
Second, Mishra and Newhouse (2009) point out the ARDL empirical model is potentially subject 
to an omitted variable bias. If these omitted, time varying, country specific factors are correlated 
with state and local fiscal policy, then the estimated coefficients,    and   , would be biased. For 
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 For example, natural amenity levels, geography, etc. 
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example, if state and local governments tend to increase highway infrastructure spending as the 
quality of their highway system declines, then    is underestimating the benefits of highway 
infrastructure expenditures as a share of GSP. The last empirical issue Mishra and Newhouse 
(2009) point out is the potential for measurement error. Measurement error in the state and local 
data, would also bias OLS estimates to zero. A 1984 agreement established the Governmental 
Accounting Standards Board (GASB) which establishes and improves standards of accounting 
and financial reporting for U.S. state and local governments.
15
 
Mishra and Newhouse (2009) address the previous three issues common to ARDL estimation 
through GMM dynamic panel data estimation strategy. A concern that state and local fiscal policy 
control variables are not strictly exogenous,  [   |   ]         , coupled with the absence of 
valid external instruments increases the overall attractiveness of GMM estimation. The GMM 
estimates are derived through the comparison of two observably similar U.S. states, using the 
portion of fiscal policy attributable to their fiscal histories, where all predetermined and 
endogenous variables are instrumented by their appropriate lags. The inclusion of the lagged 
dependent variable and country fixed effects in the control set implies   ,   ,   ,   ,    and    
are identified by the difference between the average observed fiscal policy across all jurisdictions 
and within-jurisdiction change in fiscal policy over time.  
If      in equation (E3.9), then GSP is close to a random walk. Blundell and Bond (2000) 
show that lagged levels of a random walk process are weak instruments in the first differences 
equation. In terms of estimating equation (E3.10), the difference GMM estimator (Arellano and 
Bond, 1991) is a weak estimator because lagged levels of     and     are poor instruments for 
       and     . Meanwhile, when the data are persistent the system GMM estimator increases 
estimator efficiency through the use of additional moment conditions. Specifically, the system 
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 The GASB is regarded as the official source of generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) for 
state and local governments. 
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GMM estimator also uses lagged differences of the endogenous variables as instruments in the 
levels equation (E3.9) (Arellano and Bover, 1995). This is in addition to using lagged levels of 
the endogenous variables as instruments in the differenced equation (E3.10). Therefore, by 
utilizing moment conditions from both the levels equation (E3.9) and the differences equation 
(E3.10), the system GMM estimator fits the data to a system of estimable equations.  
Although the system GMM estimator is preferred when data are persistent, the estimator does 
have a number of drawbacks. First, the underlying assumptions of the system GMM estimator are 
strong. The identification restrictions are first derived in Arellano and Bover (1995) and later 
refined in Blundell and Bond (2000). Formally stated, the model assumptions are 
(E3.11) 
 [  ]  [   ]  [     ]  
 [      ]      
 [      ]         
 [      ]         
 [      ]  
 [      ]  
.  
The Blundell and Bond (2000) refinements to the identification assumptions are represented by 
the bottom four equations in (E3.11). These initial moment conditions assume the initial levels of 
state and local fiscal policy and jurisdictional output are uncorrelated with all future disturbances 
in output. Furthermore, these moment conditions also assume the initial changes in fiscal policy 
and output are uncorrelated with the time-invariant, unobserved jurisdiction specific 
characteristics.  
Another drawback to this class of GMM estimator is the tradeoff between estimator performance 
and the number of instruments. Too many instruments weaken this type of GMM estimator. 
Specifically, a large number of instruments tend to weaken the power of Hansen’s J test for over 
identifying restrictions, leading to cases where the test falsely fails to reject the null hypothesis 
that the instruments are valid. Roodman (2009) goes on to suggest the number of instruments 
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should not exceed the number of jurisdictions. In my first attempt to reduce the number of 
instruments, I calculate the within year and within state transformations in place of including 
annual and state dummy variables. This reduces the number of instruments in the system GMM 
model by 77,      . Also, the general treatment of this class of GMM estimator is to create a 
unique instrument for each variable at each time interval. Therefore, the number of instruments 
increases exponentially as the time dimension grows. I collapse the instruments with respect to 
time and use two lags as instruments. The collapsed instrument set reduces the number of 
moment conditions to one per variable. Given the large number of instruments in my estimations 
one should be conservative in choosing the appropriate significance levels for all specification 
tests.  
In any event, the system GMM estimator is likely to provide the most accurate estimates relative 
to all other estimators that simultaneously control for autocorrelation and unobserved fixed 
effects. GMM estimation is also an attractive estimator in the absence of valid external 
instruments for the potentially endogenous set of state and local fiscal policy control variables. In 
addition, I test estimate robustness to a reduction in the number of instruments and a number of 
other changes in model specification.  
3.4  DATA 
I rely on a substantially larger dataset than most studies on the growth effects of state and local 
fiscal policy, covering 48 jurisdictions from 1977 to 2008. I take deliberate steps in order to 
maximize the number of observations. I extend the size of the dynamic panel in two dimensions: 
  and  .  Alaska and Hawaii are included for robustness checks.  The state and local fiscal data 
are subject to missing observations in 2001 and 2003. These data gaps explode after taking first 
differences. The missing data issue is exacerbated by the GMM estimator’s dependence on lagged 
moment conditions, both levels and differences. Therefore, I replace the missing observations 
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with lagged values. I follow the existing literature, e.g., Garcia-Milà, McGuire and Porter (1996), 
and Brown et al. (2003), and lag all explanatory variables by one period such that they are all at 
least nominally predetermined. The final sample includes 1,488 observations for 48 U.S. 
jurisdictions over 31 years ranging in from 1978 through 2008.   
The dependent variable in my analysis is the common log of nominal, private GSP. I do not 
impose additional measurement error by adopting national gross domestic product (GDP) 
deflators in an attempt to derive real GSP. Private industry GSP data are collected from Regional 
Economic Accounts, U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. Unemployment rate data are collected 
from Local Area Unemployment Statistics, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Amenity data are 
widely available from the USDA Economic Research Services. Although the data are constructed 
at the county level, a statewide amenity scale can be calculated by taking the weighted average by 
county population estimates. I drop     in practice from the estimable equation in order to 
preserve degrees of freedom because natural amenity measures are time invariant. Furthermore, 
jurisdiction fixed effects should capture all time invariant jurisdictional characteristics. 
The remaining explanatory variables are broken into two main categories: government revenue 
variables and government expenditure variables. State and local government financial data are 
collected from Government Finance Statistics, U.S. Census Bureau. Revenue sources include net 
federal intergovernmental revenue, total charges, and total taxes. Total taxes are defined as the 
sum of property tax, total sales tax, individual income tax, and corporate income tax. Government 
expenditures are categorized into the following locally provided government services:  public 
welfare, highway transportation, environment and housing, public safety, education as well as 
health and hospital, and other government services.  
Environment services include natural resource, and park and recreation expenditures, whereas, 
housing services include community reinvestment and sanitation. Lastly, public safety includes 
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expenditures on police and fire protection. All government financial variables are scaled by the 
private GSP then multiplied by 100, e.g., the tax variable measures the total tax revenue as a 
percentage of GSP in jurisdiction  . Therefore, estimated coefficients measure the effect of a one 
percent change in any government fiscal policy as a share of GSP when financed by the omitted 
fiscal categories, a one percent increase in miscellaneous revenues and deficit spending as a share 
of GSP. A full list of variables with data source and variable description is included in Appendix 
A3.1.  
3.4.1  OVERVIEW OF THE DATA 
For the full sample of contiguous U.S. states, excluding D.C.,
16
 and during the period 1977 
through 2008, the national average of state and local tax revenue as a share of GSP by year ranges 
from as low as 9% to as nearly high as 11%. Figure 3.1 contains the plotted data points and is a 
graphical representation of the national average state and local effective tax rate. The figure 
indicates that state and local effective tax rates declined on average during the last half of the 
1970’s and much of the mid to late 1990’s through the early 2000’s. In contrast, average state and 
local effective tax rates were increasing throughout the 1980’s and into the early 1990’s as well as 
the mid through late 2000’s. 
Figure 3.2 takes a more spatial view of state and local fiscal policy by plotting the average tax 
revenue as a percentage of GSP by U.S. Census region, i.e., Midwest, Northeast, South, and 
West. The regional average effective tax rate of state and local government plots of Figure 3.2 
tend to reflect the trends in Figure 3.1. However, there appears to be a large degree of 
heterogeneity in fiscal policy by region. For example, while the average state and local tax rates 
tend to be increasing during the 1980’s throughout the Midwest, South, and West, the average 
                                                          
16
 Congress abolished D.C.’s local government in 1874.  Although the Home Rule Act of 1973 provides 
D.C. with an elected mayor and city council, the approval of the local budget requires an act of Congress. 
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effective tax rate in the Northeast appears to trend downward. Furthermore, the average effective 
tax rate varies by as much as two and a half percentage points between Census regions in 1977 
and in 2008 by almost two percentage points. Figure 3.2 also suggests Census regions can 
generally be ranked from high to low in terms of the effective tax rates as follows: Northeast, 
West, Midwest, and South. The average effective tax rate in the Northeast ranges from 10-12% 
while in the South average rates range from 8.5-10%.  
Table 3.1 ranks the contiguous U.S. states from high to low based on state and local tax revenue 
as a share of GSP starting in 1977 and continuing on a quinquennial basis through 2007. Based 
solely on the effective tax rate of state and local government there appears to be a large degree of 
variability annually when ranking the states from high to low. For example, Oklahoma ranges in 
rank from as low as 9th to as high as 37th. Meanwhile, Louisiana ranks from lowest in the nation 
to as high as 29th. In contrast, New York ranges between ranks of 46th and 48th. The last column 
of Table 3.2 contains the average annual rank for each state from 1977 through 2008, excluding 
2001 and 2003 when the data are missing. Tennessee and Texas come in at for the lowest and 
second lowest average rank over the 31 year period. Oklahoma comes in mid pack at 26nd, and 
Louisiana is 4th lowest overall by average rank. New York holds the highest average annual 
ranking for state and local taxes at 48th. 
Although potentially misleading, Figure 3.3 is a simple scatter plot of log GSP and state and local 
tax share of GSP following within Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) code and 
within year transformations. Simple correlations between current log GSP and the lagged state 
and local tax share of GSP indicate a negative relationship for levels and differences,        and 
      , respectively. Table 3.2 contains the summary statistics for all variables. 
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3.5  RESULTS 
Some studies have found evidence that the random effects estimator is preferred to the fixed 
effects estimator. Therefore, my empirical analysis begins with Hausman (1978) specification 
tests. Under the null hypothesis the FGLS random effects (RE) estimator is the efficient and 
consistent estimator. Meanwhile, rejection of the null implies the presence of state fixed effects. 
The FE and RE estimates of equation (E3.9) are presented in columns (1) and (2) of Table 3.3. In 
Table 3.3, the first row includes the number assigned to each specific set of regression results 
while the first column contains the variable names. The second row of Table 3.3 indicates the 
estimator employed to derive estimates. Lastly, the third row contains the name of the dependent 
variable.  
Significance of the coefficients in columns (1) and (2) are based on conventional standard errors. 
The null hypothesis under the Hausman test is rejected at a significance level of 1% with a  
p-value equal to zero indicating the presence of state fixed effects. Although, I get the first 
indication that GSP may be close to a random walk, i.e.,     , I ignore these results. Nickell 
(1981) shows the estimates in column (1) are inconsistent. Therefore, these results are dismissed. 
3.5.1  ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES 
I begin my growth analysis in Table 3.4 with the OLS estimates of equation (E3.9). The first row 
of Table 3.4 indicates the number assigned to that specific set of regression results while the first 
column contains variable names. The second row of Table 3.4 indicates the estimator. Lastly, the 
third row contains the name of the dependent variable. I examine the pooled average effect of an 
increase in state and local government revenue sources and expenditure categories as a share of 
GSP on GSP growth in the following year. Recall that my estimated coefficients measure the 
growth effects attributable to a particular government fiscal category relative to the omitted 
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variable. The omitted fiscal category in my analysis is miscellaneous revenue and deficit 
spending. Additionally,                   measures the net effect of an incremental increase in 
any particular expenditure category as a share of GSP fully financed through tax rate hike. 
All OLS estimates discussed in this section are obtained from the within year transformed data 
over the full sample (Nickell, 1981). Furthermore, standard errors in the OLS regressions follow 
Brown et al. (2003) with clustering at the state identifier level. OLS estimates of equation (E3.9), 
excluding jurisdiction fixed effects, are presented in column (3) of Table 3.4. With respect to the 
national average, the coefficient associated with state and local tax revenue as a share of GSP is 
not significantly different from zero. On the other hand, government charges and 
intergovernmental revenue to finance deficit spending are positively correlated with GSP growth 
rates.   
Still in column (3) of Table 3.4, the estimated coefficients on the set of controls for state and local 
government expenditure categories indicate that expenditures as a share on GSP on welfare, 
transportation, environment and housing, and education, health and hospital, all serve as GSP 
growth deterrents when financed by deficit spending. Safety expenditure is the only expenditure 
to exhibit a positive relationship with GSP growth when financed by deficit spending, i.e., 
expenditures on safety and fire protection. The estimated effect of higher safety expenditures as a 
share of GSP suggests a greater than one to one increase in GSP growth rate following the hike in 
safety expenditures. The estimated coefficient on the unemployment rate variable indicates that 
higher unemployment rates tend to slow GSP growth rates in the following period.  
Columns (5) and (7) in Table 3.4 continue the OLS growth analysis. Column (5) adds a squared 
version of the tax variable and is intended to capture the nonlinear effects associated with the 
effective rate of state and local tax revenues. I find no statistical evidence of nonlinear response in 
growth effects. Column (7) incorporates an interaction term between the tax variable and a time 
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period dummy for years prior to 1998 and is intended to capture the shift in sensitivities for a 
change in the effective rate associated with state and local tax revenues. Similarly, given a change 
in the effective tax rate, I find no evidence of a sectional break in growth effects occurring in 
1998.  
Column (9) of Table 3.4 incorporates a set of interaction terms between the tax variable and U.S. 
Census region dummies in an attempt to capture regional heterogeneities in sensitivities to the 
effective rate of state and local tax revenues. The omitted region is the Midwest. Therefore, the 
response in any region measured relative to the Midwest is the sum of the estimated tax 
coefficient and the estimated coefficient on the interaction term between the regional dummy and 
the tax variable. I find evidence which suggests that the response of GSP growth to taxes is 
positive in the Midwest region. While GSP growth rates are less sensitive in the Northeast and 
South regions, there remains a positive net effect associated with tax rate hikes to finance state 
and local deficit spending. Meanwhile, the West region experiences a negative shock to the GSP 
growth rate following a tax rate hike. OLS parameter estimates are stable with the inclusion of the 
additional control variables.  
3.5.2  SYSTEM GENERAL METHOD OF MOMENTS 
Although the primary coefficient of interest in this study measures the effect of state tax rate on 
GSP growth, the primary coefficient of interest at the moment is on the 1 period lag of log GSP in 
column (3) of Table 3.4, i.e., Lag log10GSP. Again,      implying GSP follows close to a 
random walk. Recall, when the data are highly persistent Blundell and Bond (2000) indicates the 
system GMM estimator is the preferred estimator because lagged levels of a random walk process 
make for weak instruments in the first differences. The system GMM estimates the effect of state 
and local fiscal policy on future output growth by solving the appropriately weighted set of 
moment conditions for the system of equations (E3.9) and (E3.10). The difference between the 
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average observed fiscal policy across all jurisdictions and within-jurisdiction change in fiscal 
policy over time identify   ,   ,   ,   ,    and   .  
Following Mishra and Newhouse (2009), two and three period lagged levels of GSP and the other 
predetermined variables are used as instruments in the equation (E3.10) whereas one and two-
period lagged differences are used as instruments in equation (E3.9). Therefore, my estimates are 
obtained by comparing two observably similar U.S. states through the use of the portion of fiscal 
policy which is attributable to their fiscal histories (Mishra and Newhouse, 2009). I employ a 
two-step GMM estimation approach which is “efficient and robust to all patterns of 
heteroskedasticity and cross correlation” (Roodman, 2009). Also, the finite sample tends to bias 
standard errors severely downwards (Arellano and Bond 1991; Blundell and Bond 1998).  
Therefore, reported standard errors undergo the Windmeijer (2005) small sample correction. 
The system GMM estimates are presented in columns (4), (6), (8), and (10) of Table 3.4. The 
version of the model estimated in the preceding columns, i.e., (3), (5), (7), and (9), is reestimated 
in columns (4), (6), (8), and (10), respectively. Recall that given the large number of instruments, 
one should be conservative in choosing the appropriate significance levels for all specification 
tests. Column 4 reports the system GMM estimates for the most basic system of equations (E3.9) 
and (E3.10). Three reported statistics are of particular relevance. First, I fail to reject the over 
identification restrictions based on the Hansen J test. Therefore, under the null, my instrument set 
is valid. Second, the AR1 test of the model’s estimated errors indicate evidence of first order 
autocorrelation just as my theoretical model predicts. Third, the AR2 test of the model’s 
estimated errors indicate evidence of no second order autocorrelation.  
In column (4), the rate of output adjustment in a dynamic framework is given by the estimate for 
  , i.e., the estimated coefficient for the one-period lag of the dependent variable. The estimate 
implies that the rate of output adjustment in my dynamic model is about 1/5th of what the static 
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models predict, i.e.,       . Also, the system GMM estimates indicate no evidence of a 
statistical growth effect resulting from the effective tax rate when measured relative to deficit 
spending and miscellaneous revenue. However, in column (4) net intergovernmental revenue as a 
share of GSP promotes GSP growth rates when used to finance deficit spending. Increased 
expenditures on environment, housing, and sanitation as a share of GSP financed by deficit 
spending serve as GSP growth rate deterrents. Similarly, education, health, and hospital 
expenditures as a share of GSP and a higher state unemployment rate today is associated with 
slower growth rates of GSP in the future.  
Similar to the OLS analysis, column (6) adds a squared version of the tax variable and column (8) 
incorporates an interaction term between the tax variable and a time period dummy for years prior 
to 1998. Column (6) of Table 3.4 provides no statistical evidence of a nonlinear response in 
growth effects, while in similar fashion column (8) provides no evidence of a break in tax 
sensitivities occurring in 1998. It is important to note that in addition to within jurisdiction and 
within year transformations, the data in column (8) also undergo a within period transformation.  
Column (10) of Table 3.4 incorporates a set of interaction terms between the tax variable and 
U.S. Census region. The omitted region is still the Midwest. Again, the estimated interaction term 
measures the additional response given a change in the effective tax rate in that particular region. 
In addition, the data in column (10) undergo the within region transformation. Estimates are 
stable to the GMM dynamic panel estimation of the growth effects associated with a tax rate hike 
in the Midwest and Northeast regions. In contrast to the OLS estimates in column (9), the South 
and West now experience negative growth effects associated with tax rate hikes. Other system 
GMM parameter estimates are stable to the inclusion of the additional control variables. 
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3.5.3  COMPARISON OF THE OLS ESTIMATES AND SYSTEM GMM ESTIMATES 
In this section I will be comparing    from the static framework of equation (E3.6) when 
estimated in the dynamic framework equation, (E3.8). Recall, I estimate   and   such that   is 
recoverable, i.e.,       ,       , and       . The estimated tax coefficient in column 
(9) of Table 3.4 indicates that given a 1% hike in the effective tax rate used to finance state and 
local deficit spending, GSP growth rates increase by 0.3% in the Midwest, the omitted U.S. 
Census region. In the case wherein state and local government increase charges as a share of GSP 
by 1% to finance state and local deficit spending the GSP growth rate increases by 0.17%. On the 
other hand, when financed by government deficit spending, increasing state and local 
expenditures on education as a share of GSP by 1% reduces the growth rate of GSP by 0.24%. 
However, a 1% hike in the effective tax rate to finance the same 1% increase in education 
expenditures as a share of GSP results in only a 0.06% increase in the GSP growth rate. Lastly, if 
the state and local government increases charges in a similar fashion to finance the increase in 
education expenditures then the GSP growth rate decreases by 0.07%.  
The magnitude of the estimated coefficient for the state unemployment rate in the system GMM 
estimator, column (10), is over three times as great as the OLS estimates, column (9),  -0.20 and  
-0.62 respectively. Therefore, the two coefficients suggest that a 1 percentage point increase in 
the state unemployment rate this period translates to between a 0.20%  and 4.5% reduction in the 
future growth rate of GSP. Similarly, the GMM estimates in column (10) suggests that given a 
one percentage point increase in general education expenditures as a share of GSP relates to the 
GSP growth rate slowing down by nearly 5.1 %. Meanwhile, for the same increase in education 
expenditures as a share of GSP, OLS estimates in column (9) suggest a more modest slowdown 
of approximately 0.24%. The statistically significant GMM estimates for the growth effects of 
state and local fiscal policy as a determinant for output growth are generally greater in magnitude 
relative to the OLS estimates. This is consistent with noise in the fiscal policy variables biasing 
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the OLS estimates towards zero. On the other hand, this is also consistent with positive 
correlations between the unobserved components of GSP and state and local fiscal policy. This 
may also suggest the effective size of state and local government grows in response to worsening 
statewide economic conditions. 
Now, I will revisit column (10) of Table 3.4. Recall, column (10) estimates test for growth effect 
heterogeneities by U.S. Census region. Figures 3.4-3.7 are impulse response functions in the 
growth rate of GSP given a 1% hike in the effective tax rate by state and local government. Each 
figure includes two panels. Panel (a) models the response to a one-time tax hike. Meanwhile, 
panel (b) models the response to a permanent tax hike. Lastly, each panel includes two plots. The 
black plot measures the static response in the GSP growth rate, i.e., the log difference of equation 
(E3.6). The grey plot measures the dynamic response in the GSP growth rate, i.e., the log 
difference of equation (E3.8). Figures 3.4-3.7 contain the various impulse response functions for 
the Midwest, the Northeast, the South, and the West regions, respectively.  
Beginning in Figure 3.4, it is easy to see that the static model is significantly more responsive to 
the tax hike. For example, panel (a) indicates the 1% tax hike this period will grow GSP by 5.0% 
in the static framework,   
 , whereas GSP grows by less than one-fifth of that in the dynamic 
model,   . Also notice the shock of the one-time tax hike occurring in the first period is fully 
exhausted in the second period of the static model. In contrast the dynamic framework predicts 
that, in the Midwest, the positive growth effects persist for several periods following a tax rate 
hike before dying off to zero. Jumping to Figure 3.5, one will notice a similar but significantly 
less sensitive response to a tax hike in the Northeast region. 
The impulse response functions presented in Figures 3.6 and 3.7 are quite different from Figures 
3.4 and 3.5. Figure 3.6 indicates that GSP growth rates in the South respond negatively to tax 
hikes. Panel (b) of Figure 3.6 in particular estimates a permanent reduction of -4.8% in the 
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growth rate of GSP following a permanent tax hike. In contrast to the immediate response 
predicted by the static model, the dynamic model anticipates a -0.66% reduction in GSP growth 
rates the first year after the policy. The long run effect converges to the permanent -4.8% 
slowdown in the growth rate of GSP. This is consistent with the notion that southern states face 
fierce competition in attracting migrants. Therefore, the negative tax coefficient in the South 
indicates that southern states with higher effective tax rates experience slower growth rates in 
GSP. Figure 3.7 indicates that states in the West are even more sensitive to a tax rate hike. This 
suggests that tax rate hikes to finance deficit spending promote economic growth rates in the 
Midwest and Northeast, whereas, similar tax hikes serve as growth deterrents in the South and 
West. 
3.6  ROBUSTNESS 
In addition to the previous sets of results, I test the robustness of my estimates to a large number 
of alternatives. First, I obtain estimates over an alternate sample. Then, I evaluate the models 
performance to a reduction in the number of instruments. Later, I also evaluate a number of other 
lag structure specifications in the empirical model. Afterwards, I estimate a secondary system of 
equations following an alternative transformation of equation (E3.9). 
3.6.1  OLS AND SYSTEM GMM WITH AN ALTERNATE SAMPLE  
First, I attempt to investigate the role of influential observations with an alternate sample. Within 
the literature, it is common to consider Alaska and Hawaii to be outliers and subsequently omit 
them from the sample. Table 3.5 recreates Table 3.4 with the alternate sample consisting of all 50 
U.S. states. Table 3.5 contains both OLS and system GMM estimates. The model now rejects the 
null under the Hansen J-test in columns (12) and (14).  Estimates in columns (16) and (18) are 
generally robust to the alternate sample in sign, magnitude, but not in significance. This is 
44 
 
particularly true with the regional-tax interaction terms for the Northeast and West. Tax rate hikes 
in the South, on the other hand, continue to serve as growth deterrents.  
3.6.2  SYSTEM GMM WITH ALTERNATE INSTRUMENT STRUCTURE 
Next, I attempt to address a previously ignored drawback often associated with GMM estimation. 
In GMM estimation the researcher must pick the number of lags which are to be used as 
instruments for the endogenous and predetermined variables. As an alternative to the previous 
instrument structure, Table 3.6 includes the estimates using two-period lagged levels of the 
explanatory variables are used as instruments in the equation (E3.10) and one-period lagged 
differences of the covariates are used as instruments in equation (E3.9). Table 3.6 shows the 
Hansen’s J test for over identifying restrictions rejects the null hypothesis in columns (19). It is 
possible the linear model does not fit the data as well as the nonlinear, sectional break, and 
regional models in columns (20), (21) and (22). On the other hand, the power of the J-test is 
diminishing as the number of instruments grows. In addition, the Hansen critical values in column 
(20) and (22) are not particularly large, therefore, this alternative instrument structure is assumed 
invalid. 
3.6.3  SYSTEM GMM WITH ALTERNATIVE CONTROL VARIABLE LAG STRUCTURES  
Now, I also examine two alternative lag structures of the control variables. First, log GSP is 
regressed on contemporaneous control variables. The control set is no longer predetermined but 
rather the model suffers from simultaneity. Here, one and two-period lagged levels of GSP and 
the other endogenous variables, are used as instruments in the equation (E3.10) whereas 
contemporaneous and one-period lagged differences are used as instruments in equation (E3.9). 
Table 3.7 shows statistically significant AR(1) and insignificant AR(2) test statistics in all 
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columns. In addition, the Hansen’s J test for over identifying restrictions rejects the null 
hypothesis indicating the instrument set is invalid.  
Next, log GSP is regressed on the two-period lags of control variables. Now, three and four 
period lagged levels of GSP and the other predetermined variables, are used as instruments in the 
equation (E3.10) whereas two period lagged differences are used as instruments in equation 
(E3.9). Table 3.8 shows the Hansen’s J test for over identifying restrictions rejects the null 
hypothesis indicating the instrument set is invalid. The AR(1) test indicates that the errors are 
serially correlated of order one. Meanwhile, the AR(2) test fails to reject the null hypothesis, 
suggesting that the errors are not serially correlated beyond order one. Once again, I conclude the 
model is invalid because model does not fit the data well. 
3.6.4  SYSTEM GMM WITH BACKWARD ORTHOGONAL DEVIATIONS 
Replacing the missing data with lagged values biases the estimates to zero. Hayakawa (2009) 
recommends implementing backward orthogonal transformation in an attempt to reduce bias 
arising from the missing observations. Also, the orthogonal transformations prevent the data gaps 
from exploding. The backward orthogonally transformed version of equation (E3.10) is obtained 
by replacing the first differences with the change since the initial set of observations. Here, two 
and three period lagged levels of GSP and the other predetermined variables, are used as 
instruments in the backward orthogonally transformed version of equation (E3.10) whereas one 
period lagged backward orthogonal deviations are used as instruments in equation (E3.9).  
Table 3.9 shows the Hansen’s J test for over identifying restrictions rejects the null hypothesis 
indicating the instrument set is invalid. Again, the AR(1) test indicates that the errors are serially 
correlated of order one while the AR(2) indicates that the errors are not serially correlated beyond 
order one. Once again, I conclude the model is invalid because data do not fit the model well. 
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3.7  CONCLUSIONS 
This analysis explored the connection between regional economic growth and the effective state 
and local tax rate. I have attempted to account for the growth effects resulting from the vast array 
of public goods and services funded by state and local governments omitting deficit spending and 
miscellaneous revenues. A review of the state and local government finance literature indicates 
that competent tax studies attempt to address the following key issues: theoretical modeling, 
structuring of the data, appropriate estimation, and influential observations. This is the first study 
that I believe attempts to address the potential endogeneity of the state and local fiscal policy. 
Through appropriate theoretical modeling and the implementation of dynamic panel estimation 
strategies, I have attempted to address estimation issues common to the tax literature. 
Furthermore, I have attempted to address estimation issues typically associated with an ARDL 
estimable equation, e.g., inconsistent estimates arising from autocorrelation, predetermined 
variables, and time invariant jurisdiction characteristics which may be correlated with the 
explanatory variables, as well as, estimation bias arising from an omitted variable and/or the 
measurement error of state and local data. I follow the estimation approach of Mishra and 
Newhouse (2009) and obtain two sets of consistent estimates for the growth effects associated 
with state and local fiscal policy.  
A summary of my empirical analysis is organized into Tables 3.10 – 3.13 based on the following 
four categories: linear regressions, non-linear regressions, sectional break regressions, and 
regional regressions, respectively. The first column indicates the row number. The next two 
columns of these tables indicate the location of the regression estimates by table and column 
number. The fourth column indicates estimator while the fifth column indicates the lag structure 
of the right hand side (RHS) variables, i.e., contemporaneous, one-period lag, two-period lag. The 
sixth column indicates the sample, i.e., 48 contiguous U.S. states or the 50 U.S. states. These 
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tables also include a column which describes the set of instrumental variables utilized in the 
GMM estimation, all relevant statistical tests and the results, as well as, a discussion of the 
findings in general. When statistical tests fail to support the model general findings are dismissed. 
Note, the summary of OLS and GMM estimates for the main sample and alternate sample are 
presented in rows (1) through (4), respectively. Row (5) summarizes the model following a 
reduction in the number of instruments. Row (6) and (7) include contemporaneous and 2 period 
lagged explanatory variables, respectively. Row (8) concludes with a summary of the 
orthogonally transformed model. 
First, my pooled OLS estimates with only annual fixed effects indicate that a hike in the effective 
tax rate of state and local government is not a statistical determined of GSP growth in the 
following period. This is in contrast to simple correlations which predict a crowding out effect of 
taxation. System GMM estimates are consistent in indicating that hikes in the effective tax rate 
are not a significant determinant of state economic growth in the pooled, nation-wide analysis. 
The results are not robust to an alternative sample wherein the Alaska and Hawaii are included, a 
reduction in the number of instruments, i.e., the rows (3) and (4) of Table 3.10., or a number of 
other alternative specifications, i.e., rows (4) through (8). 
Second, I find no evidence in support of nonlinearities in the growth elasticities to the effective 
tax rate of state and local government in the pooled, nation-wide OLS analysis. The results of 
rows (1) and (2) of Table 3.11 are somewhat robust to an alternative sample wherein all 50 U.S. 
states are included, i.e., row (4) of Table 3.11. The results are again robust to a reduction in the 
number of instruments, i.e., row (5) of Table 3.11. However, I am unable to verify the robustness 
of the estimated coefficients following a number of other alternative specifications, i.e., rows (6) 
through (8) of Table 3.11  
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Third, I find no evidence in support of sectional breaks in the growth elasticities to the effective 
tax rate of state and local government in the pooled, nation-wide OLS analysis. The results of 
rows (1) and (2) of Table 3.12  are robust to an alternative sample wherein all 50 U.S. states are 
included, i.e., rows (3) and (4) of Tables 3.12. The results are again robust to a reduction in the 
number of instruments, i.e., row (5) of Table 3.12. However, I am unable to verify the robustness 
of the estimated coefficients following a number of other alternative specifications, i.e., rows (6) 
through (8) of Table 3.12. 
Fourth, both the preliminary OLS and the system GMM estimators indicate a large degree of 
heterogeneity at the regional level in response to a hike in the effect tax rate of state and local 
government, i.e., U.S. Census region. These results are robust to an alternative sample wherein all 
50 U.S. states are included, i.e., row (4) of Table 3.13. The results are again robust to a reduction 
in the number of instruments, i.e., row (5) of Table 3.13. I am unable to verify the robustness of 
the estimated coefficients following a number of other alternative specifications, i.e., rows (6) and 
(8) of Table 3.11. 
Lastly, as one may expect federal transfers to the state and local government promote GSP 
growth rates. Expenditure categories to remain statistically significant throughout the exercise 
include the negative growth effects associated with higher expenditures on environment, housing, 
sanitation, education, health, and hospital as shares of GSP. The large variation between OLS and 
GMM estimates may well likely be an indication that governments increase expenditures as the 
quality of the public service deteriorates.  
Additionally, these types of estimation strategies rely heavily on the assumption that expenditures 
by financial category as a share of GSP are good measures of the scope and/or quality of public 
goods and services. However, there is no a priori reason to believe that state and local 
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government spending as a share of GSP reflects either the scope or the quality of the provided 
public good or service. 
 In conclusion, I interpret my results as an indication that state and local policymakers should not 
be so hasty in extrapolating the results of empirical studies to their own jurisdictions and time 
periods. What is good in one region at one moment in time may not necessarily result in similar 
effects outside that time or jurisdiction, i.e., it may be advisable for the local policy maker to 
respond to local fundamentals. These results are also consistent with the notion that some regions 
are subject to either over or under leveraging by the state and local government.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
My first study finds robust evidence of a countercyclical relationship between macroeconomic 
business cycle fluctuations and individual investment in social networking. I attempt to obtain a 
refined set of estimates for the determinants of individual investment in social networking. I 
apply the most recent linear-in-means modeling and estimation techniques to address the 
reflection problem. I also attempt to account for potential unobserved heterogeneity with a two-
step estimation procedure wherein the first step instruments the observed macroeconomic 
indicators with lagged M1 and M2 growth. Initial ad hoc reference groups are based on state of 
residence, population of interview city, and decade of interview. Therefore, I attempt to achieve 
identification through the isolation of the portion of one’s socializing behavior attributable to 
geographic sorting for each decade. Lastly, my estimates are robust to restructuring of the ad hoc 
groupings. 
My second study finds evidence of regionally heterogeneous growth effects of state and local 
fiscal policy on GSP. I take a dynamic approach in modeling output by combining a partial 
adjustment process with a factor market approach for modeling regional output. I arrive at 
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an ARDL model for regional economic growth and attempt to address an extensive list of 
modeling and estimation concerns, e.g., autocorrelation, predetermined variables, and time 
invariant jurisdiction characteristics which may be correlated with the explanatory variables. 
Additionally, to my knowledge, this is the first study which attempts to address the potential 
endogenity of the state and local fiscal policy variables. My refined set of estimates indicate a 
large degree of heterogeneity between U.S. Census region in response to a hike in the effect tax 
rate of state and local government. Although these results are robust to an alternative sample and 
to a reduction in the number of instruments, I am unable to verify the estimated coefficients to a 
number of other robustness checks. 
I am an applied microeconomist in the urban and regional economics field. I provide two 
exercises: I attempt to address the reflection problem and I attempt to estimate a regional 
production function. These studies are intended to exhibit my expertise in particular areas of 
interest: networking and public policy. Additionally, these exercises demonstrate my proficiency 
in various modeling and estimation strategies. The previous studies are samples of my research 
conducted as an economics doctoral student with the Department of Economics in the Spears 
School of Business at Oklahoma State University in Stillwater, Oklahoma. These studies combine 
to form my dissertation. 
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APPENDICES 
 
 
APPENDIX A2.1: REVISITING THE REFLECTION PROBLEM 
 
Rewriting the Lee (2007) linear-in-means empirical model, equation (E2.10), in matrix notation 
yields: 
(EA2.1.1)                   
Following equations (5) through (7) in Bramoullé et al. (2009) I first solve equation (EA2.1.1) for  
  and obtain    (    )     (    )     (    )     (    )   . 
Combining like terms yields:  
(EA2.1.2)    (    )    (    )  (     )  (    )    
From equation (EA2.1.2),      is invertible because | |   . Additionally, in series notation, 
     ∑      . A subsequent series expansion of equation (EA2.1.2) yields:  
(EA2.1.3)   
 
   
     (    )∑          ∑  
      
The conditional mean of average reference group behavior is represented by: 
(EA2.1.4)  [  | ]  
 
   
      (    )∑          
Equation (EA2.1.4) is the theoretical basis for equation (E2.11). Therefore,      
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are valid instruments for           . Asymptotically, so long as    ,        and 
matrices  ,  , and    are linearly independent, social effects may be identified.        
simply implies that reference group characteristics influence the embedded individual, directly, or 
indirectly. 
 
APPENDIX A2.2: LIST OF VARIABLES AND DATA SOURCES 
Name Source Description 
natunemplfma BLS National Unemployment to Labor Force Ratio x 100 
natunemppopma BLS National Unemployment to Population Ratio x 100 
natunempempma BLS National Unemployment to Employment x 100 
m1gthl1 USFRB 1 period lag of the log difference in M1 
m2gthl1 USFRB 1 period lag of the log difference in M2 
lnsocflow GSS Individual's flow of social capital (log investment) 
male GSS Individual's sex (dummy variable, male = 1) 
nonwhite GSS Individual's race (dummy variable, white = 0) 
age GSS Individual's age 
agesq GSS Individual's age squared 
married GSS Individual's marital status (dummy variable, married = 1) 
college GSS 
Individual's educational attainment status (dummy variable, 
college degree holder = 1) 
homeowner GSS 
Individual's homeownership status (dummy variable, homeowner 
= 1) 
gr_lnsocflow GSS Group's average flow of social capital (log investment) 
gr_male GSS Group's average sex (dummy variable, male = 1) 
gr_nonwhite GSS Group's average race (dummy variable, white = 0) 
gr_age GSS Group's average age 
gr_agesq GSS Group's average age squared 
gr_married GSS Group's average marital status (dummy variable, married = 1) 
gr_college GSS 
Group's average educational attainment status (dummy variable, 
college degree holder = 1) 
gr_homeowner GSS 
Group's average homeownership status (dummy variable, 
homeowner = 1) 
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APPENDIX A2.3: IRB APPROVAL LETTER 
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APPENDIX A3.1: LIST OF VARIABLES AND DATA SOURCES 
Name Source Description 
y  BEA common log of GSP x 100 
tax Census property and nonproperty taxes / GSP x 100 
tax squared Census tax squared 
tax x pre-1998 dummy Census 
if year < 1998 then Tax x pre-1998 dummy = tax, Tax x 
pre-1998 dummy =0 otherwise 
tax x NE region dummy Census Northeast region dummy x tax 
tax x S region dummy Census South region dummy x tax 
tax x W region dummy Census West region dummy x tax 
ignet Census net intergovernmental transfers / GSP x 100 
charges Census total general charges and utility revenue / GSP x 100 
welfare Census public welfare / GSP x 100 
transportation Census hwy transportation / GSP x 100 
environhousan Census 
natural resource and parks and rec & community and 
sanitation / GSP x 100 
safety Census police and fire protection / GSP x 100 
geneduchh Census 
primary, secondary and higher education  & health and 
hospital / GSP x 100 
other Census 
direct expenditure - transportation - environhousan - safety 
– geneduchh / GSP x 100 
stateunemploymentrate BLS # unemployed / # labor force *100 
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TABLES 
 
 
2.1    SUMMARY STATISTICS 
Variable N Mean SD Min Max 
natunemplfma 15639 0.06 0.01 0.04 0.09 
natunemppopma 15639 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.06 
natunempempma 15639 0.06 0.01 0.04 0.1 
m1gthl1 15639 3.87 4.83 -3.42 12.45 
m2gthl1 15639 4.57 2.1 1.04 8.03 
lnsocflow 15639 3.45 2.46 -4.61 6.25 
male 15639 0.46 0.5 0 1 
nonwhite 15639 0.19 0.39 0 1 
age 15639 45.42 16.6 18 89 
agesq 15639 2338.11 1681.87 324 7921 
married 15639 0.5 0.5 0 1 
college 15639 0.33 0.47 0 1 
homeowner 15639 0.63 0.48 0 1 
gr_lnsocflow 15639 3.45 0.91 -4.61 6.25 
gr_male 15639 0.46 0.19 0 1 
gr_nonwhite 15639 0.19 0.24 0 1 
gr_age 15639 45.42 7.59 18 89 
gr_agesq 15639 2338.11 762.27 324 7921 
gr_married 15639 0.5 0.23 0 1 
gr_college 15639 0.33 0.22 0 1 
gr_homeowner 15639 0.63 0.27 0 1 
gr2_male 15639 0.46 0.17 0 1 
gr2_nonwhite 15639 0.19 0.24 0 1 
gr2_age 15639 45.42 7.33 18 89 
gr2_agesq 15639 2338.11 735.31 324 7921 
gr2_married 15639 0.5 0.22 0 1 
gr2_college 15639 0.33 0.21 0 1 
gr2_homeowner 15639 0.63 0.27 0 1 
Group Count 15639 18.98 16.87 2 126 
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2.2    SIMPLE CORRELATIONS: INDIVIDUAL SOCIAL FLOWS AND MACROECONOMIC INDICATORS 
variable   natunemplfma natunemppopma natunempempma 
lnsocflow   0.0141 0.0145 0.0141 
 
2.3    PREDICTED GROUP AVERAGE FLOWS 
Variable N Mean SD Min Max 
gr_lnsocflowhat 15639 3.450522 0.8297051 -4.774074 7.034817 
 
2.4    PREDICTED MACROECONOMIC INDICATORS 
Variable N Mean SD Min Max 
natunemplfmahat 15639 0.0565928 0.0090588 0.0429855 0.0718197 
natunemppopmahat 15639 0.0375349 0.0058166 0.0288285 0.0470744 
natunempempmahat 15639 0.0601706 0.0103422 0.0446063 0.0778083 
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2.5    DETERMINANTS OF INDIVIDUAL INVESTMENT IN SOCIAL NETWORKING  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Group Flow Flow natunemplf Flow 
 
First Stage 2sls First Stage 2sls 
 
        
natunemplfma - 5.400*** - 4.947** 
m1gthl1 - - 0.00186*** - 
m2gthl1 - - -0.000253*** - 
gr_lnsocflowhat - 0.488 - 0.484 
male 0.0272** 0.0481 - 0.0482 
nonwhite 0.0165 -0.172** - -0.172** 
age 0.00472** -0.0568*** - -0.0567*** 
agesq -4.47e-05** 0.000252** - 0.000251** 
married -0.0076 -0.667*** - -0.669*** 
college -0.0213 0.343*** - 0.344*** 
homeowner 0.0101 0.155** - 0.155** 
gr_male 0.465** -0.777*** - -0.775*** 
gr_nonwhite 0.211 1.133** - 1.136** 
gr_age 0.00528 0.126*** - 0.125*** 
gr_agesq -0.0003 -0.00124*** - -0.00124*** 
gr_married -0.809*** 0.0192 - 0.0142 
gr_college -0.0671 0.241 - 0.245 
gr_homeowner 0.349 0.46 - 0.461 
gr2_age 0.128*** - - - 
gr2_agesq -0.00135*** - - - 
gr2_married -0.468 - - - 
gr2_college -0.425 - - - 
gr2_homeowner 0.782 - - - 
Group FE yes yes no yes 
Constant - - 0.0506*** - 
Observations 15,639 15,639 15,639 15,639 
R-squared 0.989 0.72 0.585 0.719 
Aug R-sq 0.988 0.687 0.585 0.687 
F-stat 15125 1372 14322 1829 
Stock and Yogo critical value 31.50 19.93 
p-value of Sargan statistic 0.003 0.419 
Significance based on robust standard errors. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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2.6    ALTERNATIVE MACROECONOMIC MEASURES, DETERMINANTS OF INDIVIDUAL INVESTMENT IN SOCIAL NETWORKING  
  (5) (6) (7) 
 
(8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES Flow natunemplfma Flow 
 
Flow natunemplfma Flow 
 
2sls First Stage 2sls 
 
2sls First Stage 2sls 
 
       natunemppopma 8.424*** - 7.636** 
 
- - - 
natunempempma - - - 
 
4.701*** - 4.344** 
m1gthl1 - 0.00119*** - 
 
- 0.00213*** - 
m2gthl1 - -0.000230*** - 
 
- -0.000216*** - 
gr_lnsocflowhat 0.486 - 0.483 
 
0.491 - 0.487 
X yes no yes 
 
yes no yes 
GX yes no yes 
 
yes no yes 
G^2X no no no 
 
no no no 
Group FE yes no yes 
 
yes no yes 
Constant - 0.0340*** - 
 
- 0.0529*** - 
Observations 15,639 15,639 15,639 
 
15,639 15,639 15,639 
R-squared 0.720 0.586 0.719 
 
0.720 0.580 0.719 
Aug R-sq 0.687 0.586 0.687 
 
0.687 0.580 0.687 
F-stat 1364 15093 1812 
 
1390 13997 1958 
Stock and Yogo 10% critical value 31.50 19.93 31.50 19.93 
p-value of Sargan overidentification statistic 0.003 0.397  0.003 0.431 
Significance based on robust standard errors. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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2.7    SUMMARY OF 107 ISOLATED INDIVIDUALS 
Variable N Mean SD Min Max 
lnsocflow 107 3.19 2.65 -4.61 6.15 
male 107 0.38 0.49 0 1 
nonwhite 107 0.19 0.39 0 1 
age 107 44.97 16.49 18 89 
agesq 107 2291.83 1669.5 324 7921 
married 107 0.54 0.5 0 1 
college 107 0.35 0.48 0 1 
homeowner 107 0.64 0.48 0 1 
 
2.8    ALTERNATE AD-HOC GROUPINGS, DETERMINANTS OF INDIVIDUAL INVESTMENT IN SOCIAL NETWORKING 
  (11) (12) (13) 
 
(14) (15) (16) 
 
Observed Macro 
 
Instrumented Macro 
 
Flow Flow Flow 
 
Flow Flow Flow 
VARIABLES 2sls 2sls 2sls 
 
2sls 2sls 2sls 
  
       natunemplfma 4.550*** - - 
 
3.918* - - 
natunemppopma - 7.107*** - 
 
- 5.998* - 
natunempempma - - 3.969*** 
 
- - 3.462* 
X yes yes yes yes yes yes 
GX yes yes yes  yes yes yes 
G^2X no no no  no no no 
Group FE yes yes yes  yes yes yes 
Observations 15,737 15,737 15,737 
 
15,737 15,737 15,737 
R-squared 0.697 0.697 0.697 
 
0.697 0.697 0.697 
Aug R-sq 0.689 0.689 0.689 
 
0.689 0.689 0.689 
F-stat 147.6 147.6 147.6 
 
147.3 147.3 147.3 
Stock and Yogo 10% critical value 31.50 31.50 31.50 19.93 19.93 19.93 
p-value of Sargan overidentification statistic 0.080 0.081 0.079  0.200 0.187 0.208 
Significance based on robust standard errors. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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3.1    STATE RANKINGS FROM LOWEST (1) TO HIGHEST (48) BASED ON ANNUAL STATE AND LOCAL TAX REVENUE  
AS A SHARE OF GSP. 
USPS State Code 1977 1982 1987 1992 1997 2002 2007 Average Rank (1977-2008) 
AL  11 14 11 6 12 15 17 12 
AR  4 5 9 12 18 27 34 14 
AZ  42 30 34 38 14 18 24 32 
CA  44 27 23 26 22 24 31 23 
CO  32 7 25 14 7 4 6 13 
CT  35 21 18 32 38 26 28 31 
DE  18 13 4 1 1 1 1 3 
FL  25 17 15 31 31 20 32 19 
GA  17 19 6 9 8 9 14 8.5 
IA  15 31 37 29 21 21 10 22 
ID  13 20 27 34 37 35 23 21 
IL  20 24 13 10 13 17 16 15 
IN  5 6 10 15 19 12 8 10 
KS  22 12 22 25 33 30 35 33 
KY  7 10 17 20 26 36 29 16 
LA  1 1 2 7 10 29 13 4 
MA  45 35 20 22 25 13 19 24 
MD  46 47 41 44 42 45 42 46 
ME  39 45 44 47 48 48 46 47 
MI  29 44 36 33 28 23 30 38 
MN  38 34 33 35 39 34 25 37 
MO  6 3 5 3 9 11 11 6 
MS  21 25 14 13 36 42 41 34 
MT  37 41 45 46 46 39 38 43 
NC  12 18 12 11 11 7 12 8.5 
ND  31 11 28 21 41 31 27 35 
NE  34 22 32 19 27 28 20 25 
NH  23 9 1 28 4 5 9 7 
NJ  43 38 31 40 29 33 43 40 
NM  19 26 38 36 34 44 44 39 
NV  14 8 7 4 5 8 5 5 
NY  48 48 48 48 47 46 47 48 
OH  3 16 16 17 20 32 36 17 
OK  9 15 21 24 35 37 22 26 
OR  28 40 40 39 15 10 4 27 
PA  33 37 30 37 30 25 33 36 
RI  41 46 35 43 43 38 40 42 
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SC  24 32 24 16 16 16 26 18 
SD  30 29 19 5 6 3 2 11 
TN  10 4 3 2 2 2 7 1 
TX  2 2 8 8 3 6 3 2 
UT  26 28 39 30 24 19 15 29 
VA  36 33 26 23 23 14 21 20 
VT  47 42 46 45 45 43 48 45 
WA  27 23 29 27 32 22 18 28 
WI  40 43 43 41 40 40 37 44 
WV  16 36 42 42 44 47 45 41 
WY  8 39 47 18 17 41 39 30 
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3.2    SUMMARY STATISTICS, 1978-2008. 
Variable N Mean SD Min Max 
gdp 1488        130,000,000,000         182,000,000,000         3,460,000,000          1,680,000,000,000  
y 1488 1082.97 50.72 953.91 1222.53 
tax 1488 9.92 1.39 5.81 14.9 
ignet 1488 3.76 1.28 1.58 12.78 
charges 1488 3.63 1.33 1.27 9.84 
welfare 1488 2.47 1 0.42 6.08 
transportation 1488 1.57 0.57 0.61 3.98 
environhousan 1488 1.37 0.3 0.73 3.25 
safety 1488 0.83 0.19 0.41 1.39 
geneduchh 1488 7.82 1.46 4.32 12.8 
other 1488 6.34 1.45 2.86 13.51 
stateunemploymentrate 1488 5.73 1.95 2.25 17.45 
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3.3    HAUSMAN SPECIFICATION TEST, 1978–2008. 
  (1) (2) 
 
FE RE 
VARIABLES log10GSP log10GSP 
Lag log10GSP 0.915*** 0.998*** 
tax 0.156** 0.115** 
charges 0.620*** 0.272*** 
ignet 0.386*** 0.491*** 
welfare -0.245** -0.389*** 
transportation -0.294* -0.559*** 
environhousan -0.675*** -0.237 
safety 0.501 1.553*** 
geneduchh -0.685*** -0.313*** 
other -0.237*** -0.107** 
stateunemploymentrate -0.200*** -0.205*** 
Constant -1.12e-06 -8.17e-07 
Hausman chi-squared 147.1 
Hausman p-value 0.000 
Observations 1,488 1,488 
Number of fips 48 48 
Significance based on conventional standard errors. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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3.4    ESTIMATED EFFECT OF STATE AND LOCAL TAX RATE ON LOG DIFFERENCE IN GSP, 1978–2008. 
  (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 
OLS sysGMM OLS sysGMM OLS sysGMM OLS sysGMM 
VARIABLES log10GSP log10GSP log10GSP log10GSP log10GSP log10GSP log10GSP log10GSP 
Lag log10GSP 0.998*** 0.823*** 0.998*** 0.836*** 0.998*** 0.825*** 0.999*** 0.861*** 
tax 0.067 -0.232 0.0702 -0.283 0.0895 -0.25 0.303*** 0.698*** 
tax squared 
 
-0.00541 0.0588 
    tax x pre-1998 dummy 
   
-0.0346 0.259 
  tax x NE region dummy 
     
-0.263*** -0.537* 
tax x S region dummy 
     
-0.244** -1.362*** 
tax x W region dummy 
     
-0.366** -1.610*** 
charges 0.195** 0.466 0.195** 0.541 0.193** 0.335 0.174** 0.693** 
ignet 0.391*** 0.318* 0.393*** 0.320* 0.385*** 0.294 0.442*** 0.387** 
welfare -0.366*** 0.0306 -0.365*** 0.0225 -0.369*** 0.183 -0.405*** -0.188 
transportation -0.493*** -0.342 -0.495*** -0.343 -0.493*** -0.435 -0.490*** -0.328 
environhousan -0.0914 -0.847* -0.0902 -0.869* -0.0835 -0.756* -0.154 -1.105*** 
safety 1.418*** -0.597 1.410*** -0.918 1.413*** -1.36 1.397*** 0.0719 
geneduchh -0.240*** -0.922*** -0.243*** -0.916*** -0.238*** -0.696*** -0.244*** -0.709*** 
other -0.0695 -0.139 -0.0696 -0.126 -0.0676 -0.164 -0.0611 -0.107 
stateunemploymentrate -0.196*** -0.556*** -0.195*** -0.535*** -0.195*** -0.597*** -0.200*** -0.623*** 
Constant -8.20E-07 -0.00424 0.00979 -0.0428 -8.21E-07 -0.0276 0.0119 0.00432 
Hansen test: P-value 0.132 
 
0.134 
 
0.256 
 
0.328 
AR1 test: P-value 0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
AR2 test: P-value 0.341 
 
0.352 
 
0.263 
 
0.257 
Observations 1,488 1,488 1,488 1,488 1,488 1,488 1,488 1,488 
Number of fips 48 
 
48 
 
48 
 
48 
Number of instruments 34 
 
37 
 
37 
 
43 
Significance of the OLS estimates are based upon standard errors clustered at the state identifier. System GMM estimates undergo the two-step estimation approach 
which is efficient and robust to heteroskedasticity and cross correlation. System GMM reported standard errors are subject to Windmeijer (2005) small sample correction. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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3.5    ALTERNATE SAMPLE, 1978–2008. 
  (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
 
OLS sysGMM OLS sysGMM OLS sysGMM OLS sysGMM 
VARIABLES log10GSP log10GSP log10GSP log10GSP log10GSP log10GSP log10GSP log10GSP 
Lag log10GSP 0.998*** 0.890*** 0.999*** 0.904*** 0.998*** 0.898*** 0.999*** 0.893*** 
tax 0.0818 0.196 0.0642 0.214 0.0639 0.0141 0.336*** 0.806*** 
tax squared 
 
0.0202 -0.0501 
   
 tax x pre-1998 dummy 
   
0.0263 0.298 
  tax x NE region dummy 
     
-0.311*** -0.613 
tax x S region dummy 
     
-0.282*** -1.250*** 
tax x W region dummy 
 
    
-0.254 -0.628 
charges 0.183** 0.135 0.184** 0.295 0.184** 0.0225 0.170** 0.287 
ignet 0.421*** 0.345* 0.412*** 0.379** 0.424*** 0.352* 0.462*** 0.427** 
welfare -0.389*** 0.0298 -0.385*** -0.0667 -0.386*** 0.19 -0.407*** -0.072 
transportation -0.352** -1.411 -0.345** -1.417** -0.353** -1.293 -0.362** -1.586 
environhousan -0.364 -0.756 -0.368 -0.751* -0.368 -0.780* -0.436 -0.902* 
safety 1.626*** 0.539 1.679*** 0.503 1.628*** -0.298 1.629*** 0.937 
geneduchh -0.259*** -0.819*** -0.244*** -0.839*** -0.260*** -0.606** -0.281*** -0.741*** 
other -0.0342 -0.107 -0.036 -0.15 -0.0349 -0.159 -0.0271 -0.0876 
stateunemploymentrate -0.168*** -0.555*** -0.172*** -0.528*** -0.169*** -0.558*** -0.172*** -0.567*** 
Constant -3.49E-06 -0.0416 -0.0398 -0.0212 -3.49E-06 -0.0536 0.0147 -0.0264 
Hansen test: P-value 0.0768 
 
0.083 
 
0.137 
 
0.213 
AR1 test: P-value 0.0314 
 
0.0298 
 
0.0285 
 
0.0352 
AR2 test: P-value 0.793 
 
0.797 
 
0.732 
 
0.709 
Observations 1,550 1,550 1,550 1,550 1,550 1,550 1,550 1,550 
Number of fips 50 
 
50 
 
50 
 
50 
Number of instruments 34   37   37   43 
Significance of the OLS estimates are based upon standard errors clustered at the state identifier. System GMM estimates undergo the two-step estimation approach 
which is efficient and robust to heteroskedasticity and cross correlation. System GMM reported standard errors are subject to Windmeijer (2005) small sample correction. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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3.6    ALTERNATE INSTRUMENTS, 1978–2008. 
  (19) (20) (21) (22) 
 
sysGMM sysGMM sysGMM sysGMM 
VARIABLES log10GSP log10GSP log10GSP log10GSP 
Lag log10GSP 0.812*** 0.812*** 0.825*** 0.834*** 
tax -0.248 -0.346 -0.25 0.841** 
tax squared 0.104 
  tax x pre-1998 dummy 
 
0.259 
 tax x NE region dummy 
  
-0.489 
tax x S region dummy 
  
-2.198*** 
tax x W region dummy 
 
 
-1.969*** 
charges 0.639 0.643 0.335 0.623 
ignet 0.0233 0.0269 0.294 0.336 
welfare 0.313 0.304 0.183 -0.037 
transportation 0.106 0.0932 -0.435 0.221 
environhousan -0.587* -0.608* -0.756* -0.55 
safety -0.258 -0.111 -1.36 0.822 
geneduchh -1.439*** -1.403*** -0.696*** -0.936** 
other 0.248 0.254 -0.164 0.0622 
stateunemploymentrate -0.763*** -0.760*** -0.597*** -0.767*** 
Constant -0.0102 -0.0579 -0.0276 0.0183 
Hansen test: P-value 0.0771 0.106 0.256 0.146 
AR1 test: P-value 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 
AR2 test: P-value 0.268 0.299 0.263 0.231 
Observations 1,488 1,488 1,488 1,488 
Number of fips 48 48 48 48 
Number of instruments 23 25 37 29 
System GMM estimates undergo the two-step estimation approach which is efficient and robust to heteroskedasticity and cross correlation. System GMM reported 
standard errors are subject to Windmeijer (2005) small sample correction. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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3.7    CONTEMPORANEOUS EXPLANATORY VARIABLES, 1978–2008. 
  (23) (24) (25) (26) 
 
sysGMM sysGMM sysGMM sysGMM 
VARIABLES log10GSP log10GSP log10GSP log10GSP 
Lag log10GSP 0.687*** 0.689*** 0.677*** 0.696*** 
tax -1.041*** -1.036*** -0.747*** -1.058** 
tax squared 0.111 
  tax x pre-1998 dummy 
 
-0.0823 
 tax x NE region dummy 
  
0.522 
tax x S region dummy 
  
-0.224 
tax x W region dummy 
  
-0.0972 
charges -0.335 -0.308 -0.44 -0.246 
ignet 0.335 0.318 0.27 0.369 
welfare -0.219 -0.303 -0.155 -0.336 
transportation -0.277 -0.323 -0.304 -0.217 
environhousan -0.743 -0.766* -0.835* -0.696* 
safety -2.622 -2.291 -3.219* -2.265 
geneduchh -1.259*** -1.246*** -1.072*** -1.230*** 
other -0.272 -0.295 -0.306 -0.312 
stateunemploymentrate -0.0989 -0.109 -0.133 -0.136 
Constant -0.0262 -0.0668 -0.0297 -0.015 
Hansen test: P-value 0.02 0.0311 0.0316 0.0635 
AR1 test: P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR2 test: P-value 0.152 0.116 0.18 0.195 
Observations 1,488 1,488 1,488 1,488 
Number of fips 48 48 48 48 
Number of instruments 34 37 37 43 
System GMM estimates undergo the two-step estimation approach which is efficient and robust to heteroskedasticity and cross correlation. System GMM reported 
standard errors are subject to Windmeijer (2005) small sample correction. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
79 
 
3.8   TWO PERIOD LAGGED EXPLANATORY VARIABLES, 1978-2008. 
  (27) (28) (29) (30) 
 
sysGMM sysGMM sysGMM sysGMM 
VARIABLES log10GSP log10GSP log10GSP log10GSP 
Lag log10GSP 1.081*** 1.104*** 1.085*** 1.079*** 
tax 0.139 0.243 -0.138 0.478 
tax squared -0.155 
  tax x pre-1998 dummy 
 
0.325 
 tax x NE region dummy 
  
-0.147 
tax x S region dummy 
  
-0.356 
tax x W region dummy 
  
-0.637 
charges 1.164* 1.188* 1.105* 1.099** 
ignet 1.204*** 1.229*** 1.189*** 1.291*** 
welfare -0.00598 -0.0773 0.0419 -0.157 
transportation -1.203*** -1.187*** -1.212*** -1.054*** 
environhousan -1.465** -1.532** -1.358** -1.376** 
safety -0.6 -0.49 -0.732 -1.087 
geneduchh -0.0834 -0.103 -0.0194 -0.14 
other -0.272 -0.273 -0.243 -0.238 
stateunemploymentrate -0.399** -0.355** -0.431*** -0.376** 
Constant 0.011 0.0647 0.00762 -0.0126 
Hansen test: P-value 0.0205 0.0335 0.0462 0.102 
AR1 test: P-value 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 
AR2 test: P-value 0.829 0.93 0.799 0.775 
Observations 1,440 1,440 1,440 1,440 
Number of fips 48 48 48 48 
Number of instruments 34 37 37 43 
System GMM estimates undergo the two-step estimation approach which is efficient and robust to heteroskedasticity and cross correlation. System GMM reported 
standard errors are subject to Windmeijer (2005) small sample correction. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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3.9    BACKWARD ORTHOGONAL TRANSFORMATIONS, 1978-2008. 
  (31) (32) (33) (34) 
 
sysGMM sysGMM sysGMM sysGMM 
VARIABLES log10GSP log10GSP log10GSP log10GSP 
Lag log10GSP 0.961*** 0.957*** 0.949*** 0.956*** 
tax -0.206 -0.133 0.057 0.374 
tax squared -0.0781 
  tax x pre-1998 dummy 
 
-0.342 
 tax x NE region dummy 
  
-0.146 
tax x S region dummy 
  
-0.978* 
tax x W region dummy 
  
-0.681* 
charges 0.48 0.429 0.517 0.555 
ignet 0.188 0.244** 0.110 0.216 
welfare 0.183 0.117 0.100 0.125 
transportation -0.246 -0.0761 -0.099 -0.134 
environhousan -0.724 -0.683 -0.855 -0.978* 
safety 0.564 -0.23 0.028 0.194 
geneduchh -1.048*** -1.002*** -1.110*** -1.089*** 
other 0.166 0.132 0.172 0.219* 
stateunemploymentrate -0.525*** -0.509*** -0.506*** -0.545*** 
Constant -0.00589 0.0302 0.002 -0.00543 
Hansen test: P-value 0.0356 0.0612 0.026 0.0869 
AR1 test: P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR2 test: P-value 0.365 0.368 0.359 0.239 
Observations 1,488 1,488 1,488 1,488 
Number of fips 48 48 48 48 
Number of instruments 34 37 37 43 
System GMM estimates undergo the two-step estimation approach which is efficient and robust to heteroskedasticity and cross correlation. System GMM reported 
standard errors are subject to Windmeijer (2005) small sample correction. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
81 
 
3.10  SUMMARY OF EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS: LINEAR REGRESSIONS. 
Row Table Column Estimator RHS Lag Structure Sample 
Set of Instrumental 
Variables 
Statistical Test Results General Findings 
(1) 3.4 3 OLS One Period Lag 
48 
contiguous 
US States 
N/A N/A 
No evidence of a statistical growth effect 
resulting from the effective tax rate when 
measured relative to deficit spending and 
miscellaneous revenue. β_1 1 implying 
that GSP follows close to a random walk.  
(2) 3.4 4 
Two-step 
System 
GMM 
One Period Lag 
48 
contiguous 
US States 
Two and three period 
lagged levels and one 
period lagged 
differences  
The Hansen J test fails to reject the null 
hypothesis suggesting that model is 
statistically valid. Rejection of the null in 
the AR(1) test indicates that the errors are 
serially correlated of order one. The AR(2) 
test fails to reject the null suggesting that the 
errors are not serially correlated beyond 
order one. 
No evidence of a statistical growth effect 
resulting from the effective tax rate when 
measured relative to deficit spending and 
miscellaneous revenue. β_1 0.82  implying 
that GSP does not follow a random walk.  
(3) 3.5 11 OLS One Period Lag 
50 US 
States 
N/A N/A 
No evidence of a statistical growth effect 
resulting from the effective tax rate when 
measured relative to deficit spending and 
miscellaneous revenue. β_1 1 implying 
that GSP follows close to a random walk.  
(4) 3.5 12 
Two-step 
System 
GMM 
One Period Lag 
50 US 
States 
Two and three period 
lagged levels and one 
period lagged 
differences  
The Hansen J test rejects the null hypothesis 
suggesting that model is statistically invalid. 
Rejection of the null in the AR(1) test 
indicates that the errors are serially 
correlated of order one. The AR(2) test fails 
to reject the null suggesting that the errors 
are not serially correlated beyond order one. 
N/A 
(5) 3.6 19 
Two-step 
System 
GMM 
One Period Lag 
48 
contiguous 
US States 
Two period lagged 
levels and one period 
lagged differences  
The Hansen J test rejects the null hypothesis 
suggesting that model is statistically invalid. 
Rejection of the null in the AR(1) test 
indicates that the errors are serially 
correlated of order one. The AR(2) test fails 
to reject the null suggesting that the errors 
are not serially correlated beyond order one. 
N/A 
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(6) 3.7 23 
Two-step 
System 
GMM 
Contemporaneous 
48 
contiguous 
US States 
One and two period 
lagged levels and 
contemporaneous 
differences  
The Hansen J test rejects the null hypothesis 
suggesting that model is statistically invalid. 
Rejection of the null in the AR(1) test 
indicates that the errors are serially 
correlated of order one. The AR(2) test fails 
to reject the null suggesting that the errors 
are not serially correlated beyond order one. 
N/A 
(7) 3.8 27 
Two-step 
System 
GMM 
Two Period Lag 
48 
contiguous 
US States 
Three and four period 
lagged levels and two 
period lagged 
differences  
The Hansen J test rejects the null hypothesis 
suggesting that model is statistically invalid. 
Rejection of the null in the AR(1) test 
indicates that the errors are serially 
correlated of order one. The AR(2) test fails 
to reject the null suggesting that the errors 
are not serially correlated beyond order one. 
N/A 
(8) 3.9 31 
Orthogonal 
Two-step 
System 
GMM 
One Period Lag 
48 
contiguous 
US States 
Two and three period 
lagged levels and one 
period lagged 
orthogonal differences  
The Hansen J test rejects the null hypothesis 
suggesting that model is statistically invalid. 
Rejection of the null in the AR(1) test 
indicates that the errors are serially 
correlated of order one. The AR(2) test fails 
to reject the null suggesting that the errors 
are not serially correlated beyond order one. 
N/A 
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3.11  SUMMARY OF EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS: NONLINEAR REGRESSIONS. 
Row  Table Column Estimator RHS Lag Structure Sample 
Set of Instrumental 
Variables 
Statistical Test Results General Findings 
(1)  3.4 5 OLS One Period Lag 
48 
contiguous 
US States 
N/A N/A 
No evidence of a statistical growth effect 
resulting from the effective tax rate when 
measured relative to deficit spending and 
miscellaneous revenue. β_1 1 implying 
that GSP follows close to a random walk.  
(2)  3.4 6 
Two-step 
System 
GMM 
One Period Lag 
48 
contiguous 
US States 
Two and three period 
lagged levels and one 
period lagged 
differences  
The Hansen J test fails to reject the null 
hypothesis suggesting that model is 
statistically valid. Rejection of the null in 
the AR(1) test indicates that the errors are 
serially correlated of order one. The 
AR(2) test fails to reject the null 
suggesting that the errors are not serially 
correlated beyond order one. 
No evidence of a statistical growth effect 
resulting from the effective tax rate when 
measured relative to deficit spending and 
miscellaneous revenue. β_1 0.84 
implying that GSP does not follow a 
random walk.  
(3)  3.5 13 OLS One Period Lag 
50 US 
States 
N/A N/A 
No evidence of a statistical growth effect 
resulting from the effective tax rate when 
measured relative to deficit spending and 
miscellaneous revenue. β_1 1 implying 
that GSP follows close to a random walk.  
(4)  3.5 14 
Two-step 
System 
GMM 
One Period Lag 
50 US 
States 
Two and three period 
lagged levels and one 
period lagged 
differences  
The Hansen J test rejects the null 
hypothesis suggesting that model is 
statistically invalid. Rejection of the null 
in the AR(1) test indicates that the errors 
are serially correlated of order one. The 
AR(2) test fails to reject the null 
suggesting that the errors are not serially 
correlated beyond order one. 
N/A 
(5)  3.6 20 
Two-step 
System 
GMM 
One Period Lag 
48 
contiguous 
US States 
Two period lagged 
levels and one period 
lagged differences  
The Hansen J test fails to reject the null 
hypothesis suggesting that model is 
statistically valid. Rejection of the null in 
the AR(1) test indicates that the errors are 
serially correlated of order one. The 
AR(2) test fails to reject the null 
suggesting that the errors are not serially 
correlated beyond order one. 
No evidence of a statistical growth effect 
resulting from the effective tax rate when 
measured relative to deficit spending and 
miscellaneous revenue. β_1 0.81 
implying that GSP does not follow a 
random walk. 
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(6)  3.7 24 
Two-step 
System 
GMM 
Contemporaneous 
48 
contiguous 
US States 
One and two period 
lagged levels and 
contemporaneous 
differences  
The Hansen J test rejects the null 
hypothesis suggesting that model is 
statistically invalid. Rejection of the null 
in the AR(1) test indicates that the errors 
are serially correlated of order one. The 
AR(2) test fails to reject the null 
suggesting that the errors are not serially 
correlated beyond order one. 
N/A 
(7)  3.8 28 
Two-step 
System 
GMM 
Two Period Lag 
48 
contiguous 
US States 
Three and four period 
lagged levels and two 
period lagged 
differences  
The Hansen J test rejects the null 
hypothesis suggesting that model is 
statistically invalid. Rejection of the null 
in the AR(1) test indicates that the errors 
are serially correlated of order one. The 
AR(2) test fails to reject the null 
suggesting that the errors are not serially 
correlated beyond order one. 
N/A 
(8)  3.9 32 
Orthogonal 
Two-step 
System 
GMM 
One Period Lag 
48 
contiguous 
US States 
Two and three period 
lagged levels and one 
period lagged 
orthogonal differences  
The Hansen J test rejects the null 
hypothesis suggesting that model is 
statistically invalid. Rejection of the null 
in the AR(1) test indicates that the errors 
are serially correlated of order one. The 
AR(2) test fails to reject the null 
suggesting that the errors are not serially 
correlated beyond order one. 
N/A 
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3.12  SUMMARY OF EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS: SECTIONAL BREAK IN GROWTH EFFECTS OCCURRING IN 1998. 
Row  Table Column Estimator RHS Lag Structure Sample 
Set of Instrumental 
Variables 
Statistical Test Results General Findings 
(1)  3.4 7 OLS One Period Lag 
48 
contiguous 
US States 
N/A N/A 
No evidence of a statistical growth effect 
resulting from the effective tax rate when 
measured relative to deficit spending and 
miscellaneous revenue. β_1 1 implying 
that GSP follows close to a random walk.  
(2)  3.4 8 
Two-step 
System 
GMM 
One Period Lag 
48 
contiguous 
US States 
Two and three period 
lagged levels and one 
period lagged 
differences  
The Hansen J test fails to reject the null 
hypothesis suggesting that model is 
statistically valid. Rejection of the null in 
the AR(1) test indicates that the errors are 
serially correlated of order one. The 
AR(2) test fails to reject the null 
suggesting that the errors are not serially 
correlated beyond order one. 
No evidence of a statistical growth effect 
resulting from the effective tax rate when 
measured relative to deficit spending and 
miscellaneous revenue. β_1 0.83 
implying that GSP does not follow a 
random walk.  
(3)  3.5 15 OLS One Period Lag 
50 US 
States 
N/A N/A 
No evidence of a statistical growth effect 
resulting from the effective tax rate when 
measured relative to deficit spending and 
miscellaneous revenue. β_1 1 implying 
that GSP follows close to a random walk.  
(4)  3.5 16 
Two-step 
System 
GMM 
One Period Lag 
50 US 
States 
Two and three period 
lagged levels and one 
period lagged 
differences  
The Hansen J test fails to reject the null 
hypothesis suggesting that model is 
statistically valid. Rejection of the null in 
the AR(1) test indicates that the errors are 
serially correlated of order one. The 
AR(2) test fails to reject the null 
suggesting that the errors are not serially 
correlated beyond order one. 
No evidence of a statistical growth effect 
resulting from the effective tax rate when 
measured relative to deficit spending and 
miscellaneous revenue. β_1 0.90 
implying that GSP does not follow a 
random walk.  
(5)  3.6 21 
Two-step 
System 
GMM 
One Period Lag 
48 
contiguous 
US States 
Two period lagged 
levels and one period 
lagged differences  
The Hansen J test fails to reject the null 
hypothesis suggesting that model is 
statistically valid. Rejection of the null in 
the AR(1) test indicates that the errors are 
serially correlated of order one. The 
AR(2) test fails to reject the null 
suggesting that the errors are not serially 
correlated beyond order one. 
No evidence of a statistical growth effect 
resulting from the effective tax rate when 
measured relative to deficit spending and 
miscellaneous revenue. β_1 0.83 
implying that GSP does not follow a 
random walk. 
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(6)  3.7 25 
Two-step 
System 
GMM 
Contemporaneous 
48 
contiguous 
US States 
One and two period 
lagged levels and 
contemporaneous 
differences  
The Hansen J test rejects the null 
hypothesis suggesting that model is 
statistically invalid. Rejection of the null 
in the AR(1) test indicates that the errors 
are serially correlated of order one. The 
AR(2) test fails to reject the null 
suggesting that the errors are not serially 
correlated beyond order one. 
N/A 
(7)  3.8 29 
Two-step 
System 
GMM 
Two Period Lag 
48 
contiguous 
US States 
Three and four period 
lagged levels and two 
period lagged 
differences  
The Hansen J test rejects the null 
hypothesis suggesting that model is 
statistically invalid. Rejection of the null 
in the AR(1) test indicates that the errors 
are serially correlated of order one. The 
AR(2) test fails to reject the null 
suggesting that the errors are not serially 
correlated beyond order one. 
N/A 
(8)  3.9 33 
Orthogonal 
Two-step 
System 
GMM 
One Period Lag 
48 
contiguous 
US States 
Two and three period 
lagged levels and one 
period lagged 
orthogonal differences  
The Hansen J test rejects the null 
hypothesis suggesting that model is 
statistically invalid. Rejection of the null 
in the AR(1) test indicates that the errors 
are serially correlated of order one. The 
AR(2) test fails to reject the null 
suggesting that the errors are not serially 
correlated beyond order one. 
N/A 
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3.13  SUMMARY OF EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS: REGIONAL REGRESSIONS. 
Row  Table Column Estimator RHS Lag Structure Sample 
Set of Instrumental 
Variables 
Statistical Test Results General Findings 
(1)  3.4 9 OLS One Period Lag 
48 
contiguous 
US States 
N/A N/A 
1% hike in the effective tax rate used to 
finance state and local deficit spending 
GSP growth rates increase by 0.3% in the 
W. Regional heterogeneities in tax 
sensitivities are present. β_1 1 implying 
that GSP follows close to a random walk.  
(2)  3.4 10 
Two-step 
System 
GMM 
One Period Lag 
48 
contiguous 
US States 
Two and three period 
lagged levels and one 
period lagged 
differences  
The Hansen J test fails to reject the null 
hypothesis suggesting that model is 
statistically valid. Rejection of the null in 
the AR(1) test indicates that the errors are 
serially correlated of order one. The 
AR(2) test fails to reject the null 
suggesting that the errors are not serially 
correlated beyond order one. 
1% hike in the effective tax rate used to 
finance state and local deficit spending 
GSP growth rates increase by 5.0% (West 
Region Omitted). Regional 
heterogeneities in tax sensitivities persist. 
β_1 0.86 implying that GSP does not 
follow a random walk.  
(3)  3.5 17 OLS One Period Lag 
50 US 
States 
N/A N/A 
1% hike in the effective tax rate used to 
finance state and local deficit spending 
GSP growth rates increase by 0.38% in 
the W. Regional heterogeneities in tax 
sensitivities are present. β_1 1 implying 
that GSP follows close to a random walk.  
(4)  3.5 18 
Two-step 
System 
GMM 
One Period Lag 
50 US 
States 
Two and three period 
lagged levels and one 
period lagged 
differences  
The Hansen J test fails to reject the null 
hypothesis suggesting that model is 
statistically valid. Rejection of the null in 
the AR(1) test indicates that the errors are 
serially correlated of order one. The 
AR(2) test fails to reject the null 
suggesting that the errors are not serially 
correlated beyond order one. 
1% hike in the effective tax rate used to 
finance state and local deficit spending 
GSP growth rates increase by 7.5% (West 
Region Omitted). Regional 
heterogeneities in tax sensitivities persist. 
β_1 0.89 implying that GSP does not 
follow a random walk.  
(5)  3.6 22 
Two-step 
System 
GMM 
One Period Lag 
48 
contiguous 
US States 
Two period lagged 
levels and one period 
lagged differences  
The Hansen J test fails to reject the null 
hypothesis suggesting that model is 
statistically valid. Rejection of the null in 
the AR(1) test indicates that the errors are 
serially correlated of order one. The 
AR(2) test fails to reject the null 
suggesting that the errors are not serially 
correlated beyond order one. 
1% hike in the effective tax rate used to 
finance state and local deficit spending 
GSP growth rates increase by 5.1% (West 
Region Omitted). Regional 
heterogeneities in tax sensitivities persist. 
β_1 0.83 implying that GSP does not 
follow a random walk. 
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(6)  3.7 26 
Two-step 
System 
GMM 
Contemporaneous 
48 
contiguous 
US States 
One and two period 
lagged levels and 
contemporaneous 
differences  
The Hansen J test rejects the null 
hypothesis suggesting that model is 
statistically invalid. Rejection of the null 
in the AR(1) test indicates that the errors 
are serially correlated of order one. The 
AR(2) test fails to reject the null 
suggesting that the errors are not serially 
correlated beyond order one. 
N/A 
(7)  3.8 30 
Two-step 
System 
GMM 
Two Period Lag 
48 
contiguous 
US States 
Three and four period 
lagged levels and two 
period lagged 
differences  
The Hansen J test fails to reject the null 
hypothesis suggesting that model is 
statistically valid. Rejection of the null in 
the AR(1) test indicates that the errors are 
serially correlated of order one. The 
AR(2) test fails to reject the null 
suggesting that the errors are not serially 
correlated beyond order one 
No evidence of a statistical growth effect 
resulting from the effective tax rate when 
measured relative to deficit spending and 
miscellaneous revenue. No evidence of 
regional heterogeneities. β_1 1 implying 
that GSP follows close to a random walk. 
(8)  3.9 34 
Orthogonal 
Two-step 
System 
GMM 
One Period Lag 
48 
contiguous 
US States 
Two and three period 
lagged levels and one 
period lagged 
orthogonal differences  
The Hansen J test rejects the null 
hypothesis suggesting that model is 
statistically invalid. Rejection of the null 
in the AR(1) test indicates that the errors 
are serially correlated of order one. The 
AR(2) test fails to reject the null 
suggesting that the errors are not serially 
correlated beyond order one. 
N/A 
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FIGURES 
2.1  DIFFERENT SOURCES OF INFLUENCE ON INDIVIDUAL SOCIAL NETWORK INVESTMENT 
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2.2  GROUP SIZE DENSITY PLOT  
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3.1  NATIONAL AVERAGE STATE AND LOCAL TAX RATE BY YEAR, 1977-2008. 
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3.2  ANNUAL AVERAGE STATE AND LOCAL TAX RATE BY U.S. CENSUS REGION, 1977-2008. 
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3.3  SCATTER PLOT OF LOG GSP AND STATE AND LOCAL TAX SHARE OF GSP FOLLOWING WITHIN FIPS AND WITHIN YEAR 
TRANSFORMATIONS (1977-2007) 
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3.4  IMPULSE RESPONSE FOLLOWING A 1% INCREASE IN THE EFFECTIVE  
TAX RATE - MIDWEST REGION. 
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3.5  IMPULSE RESPONSE FOLLOWING A 1% INCREASE IN THE EFFECTIVE  
TAX RATE - NORTHEAST REGION. 
  
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
lo
g
 d
if
fe
re
n
ce
 G
S
P
 
Time 
(a) One Time Change 
Qt*
Qt
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
lo
g
 d
if
fe
re
n
ce
 G
S
P
 
Time 
(b) Permanent Change 
Qt*
Qt
96 
 
3.6  IMPULSE RESPONSE FOLLOWING A 1% INCREASE IN THE EFFECTIVE  
TAX RATE - SOUTH REGION. 
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3.7  IMPULSE RESPONSE FOLLOWING A 1% INCREASE IN THE EFFECTIVE  
TAX RATE - WEST REGION. 
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